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"PUBLIC POLICY" IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
MONRAD G. PAULSEN* AND MICHAEL r. SOVERNI
I. INTRODUCTION
In deciding a conflict of laws question, a judge will sometimes say, "The
foreign law ordinarily applicable will not be applied in this case because to do
so would violate our public policy." The textwriters, language in the cases,
and the Restatement agree: the "normal" operation of choice of law rules is
subject to a "public policy" limitation. This paper is an attempt to explore the
meanings and significance of "public policy," used in this general way, in the
conflict of laws.
It is commonly assumed that to reject the application of foreign law on
public policy grounds is to assert that somehow the content of the foreign law,
when tested by notions at the forum, is seriously deficient in quality. Em-
ployed in this sense the forum's public policy sits in judgment over the wisdom
and fairness of the foreign law. In this vein Judge Goodrich has written that
when a judge rejects the application of foreign law on public policy grounds,
"[I]t is not that the foreign law does not seem so reasonable to the judge as
his own good homemade precedent, but it must appear 'pernicious and de-
testable' or, to borrow Mr. Justice Cardozo's always effective language, 'violate
some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good
morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.' " Professor Stum-
berg has expressed a similar idea, "Relief may be refused at the forum because
of disapproval, on grounds of policy there, of the particular cause of action as
such.' 2 Judge Beach reacted to such a definition of public policy when he
wrote: "It would be an intolerable affectation of superior virtue for the courts
of one state to pretend that the mere enforcement of a right validly created by
the laws of a sister state 'would be repugnant to good morals, would lead to
disturbance and disorganization of the local municipal law,' or would be of
Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
t Associate Professor of Law, Univ. of Minnesota Law School.
1. Goodrich, Foreign Facts and Local Fancies, 25 VA. L. REv. 26, 33-34 (1938); see
Note, The Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 508 (1933), for an
attempt to define the public policy concept.
2. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CoNFLIct OF LAws 168 n. 97 (2d ed. 1951).
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such evil example as to corrupt the jury or the public."3 Consistent with this
conception of the public policy limitation is the formulation of the Restatement:
"No action can be maintained upon a cause of action created in another state
the enforcement of which is contrary to the strong public policy of the forum. ' 4
Comment b to this section of the Restatement points out that, "A mere
difference between the laws of the two states will not render the enforcement of
a cause of action created in one state contrary to the public policy of the other."
However, the Restatement does not expressly restrict the application of the
public policy limitation to cases involving a qualitatively inferior foreign law.5
The idea that there is also a quantitative test for rejecting foreign law finds
some support in the cases: a great difference between foreign law and forum
law has, on occasion, been enough to persuade a court that foreign law should
not be applied, even though there is nothing particularly offensive about it.0
Whether foreign law is rejected because it is immoral and vicious or merely
because it is sharply different from the law of the forum, the simplest kind of
two-state situation is posited. A claim based on a transaction with all its im-
portant contacts in State A is denied enforcement in State B because of the
content of State A's law.
Much of the criticism of the public policy exception is in one way or an-
other related to this idea that, under the limitation, foreign law is not used
because of what it provides. Judge Goodrich clearly has this idea in mind when
he writes, "[A] plaintiff in a Conflict of Laws case does not seek to do some-
thing that is against public policy in its local sense. He is asking the court to
give legal effect to acts done elsewhere and in accordance with the law there
prevailing. The court by responding does not abdicate to foreign law and does
not break down local control over local transactions."7 Judge Beach, as we
have seen, referred to the employment of the rule as an "intolerable affectation
of superior virtue."'8 The Restatement9 and Professor Beale1° assert that the
3. Beach, Uniformn Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights, 27 YALE L.J. 656, 662(1918) .; see Goodrich, spra note 1, at 35: "As among our states, the sight of the courts of
one state refusing to apply the lav of another because the second state's rule shocks the
morals of the forum, is one to make the judicious grieve."
4. RESTATFmENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 612 (1934).
5. The illustrations appended to § 612 of the Restatement do, however, refer only to
cases in which foreign law is rejected because it is below the forum's standards. Both
cases posited involve foreign gambling transactions.
6. Hudson v. Von Hamm, 85 Cal. App. 323, 259 Pac. 374 (1927) ; Clough v. Gardiner,
111 Misc. 244, 182 N.Y. Supp. 803 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 194 App. Div. 923, 184 N.Y. Supp.
914 (2d Dep't 1920) ; see discussion of "similarity" doctrine in text at note 24 infra.
7. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 21-22 (3d ed. 1949) ; see Goodrich, Public Policy in
the Law of Conflicts, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 156, 170 (1930) : "But as one reads through the de-
cisions on Conflict of Laws there appear too many instances where a foreign solution of a
problem is denied local effect because the domestic solution is different."
8. Beach, supra note 3.
9. RESTATEmENT, CONFLICr OF LAws § 612, comment c (1934).
10. See B.ALE, CoN FIcr OF LAws 1651 (1935).
[Vol. 56
"PUBLIC POLICY" IN CONFLICTS
application of the exception should be very limited at least between states of the
Union because differences in policy among them are of minor nature.
The critics, seeing the problem in this light, make with much force the
point that the public policy limitation is not simply an exception to the applica-
tion of a certain conflict of laws rule, but is an idea which threatens the funda-
mental conceptions underlying the entire conflicts law. The limitation asserts
that local policy should control a situation entirely foreign to the concerns of
the forum. Furthermore, the public policy rule understood in this way may
deprive a deserving claimant of compensation without the gain of any sensible
objective of the forum.
Why does a court engage in this silly kind of enterprise-localism without
purpose? In an earlier day, when conflict of laws was new and strange to the
common law, perhaps it was reasonable to hold fast to a principle which re-
served a way out should the passage to decision by reference to foreign law
prove too fearful. Early American analyses of conflicts law, depending so
heavily on the term "comity," may have encouraged talk about not using for-
eign law because of public policy. For example, consider this language from a
leading old Massachusetts case:
But, as the laws of foreign countries are not admitted ex proprio
vigore, but only ex comitate, the judicial power will exercise a discre-
tion with respect to the laws they may be called upon to sanction; for,
if they should be manifestly unjust, or calculated to injure their own
citizens, they ought to be rejected.11
Indeed, Judge Beach countered the talk of comity by offering the theory of
vested rights as a way of explaining conflict of laws.1 2 He hoped thereby to
destroy the public policy principle at least as between the states. But today,
when "comity" with its corollary ideas of discretion and reciprocity is no
longer the key to conflicts theory and when the conflicts case is no longer a
rarity in the courtroom, why do states refuse to apply foreign law simply be-
cause of what that law provides? To gain insight into this question we have
undertaken a comprehensive review of the case law.
At the outset one is met by a problem of classification. It is difficult to
determine in many cases whether the court has refused to apply foreign law
on the ground that the foreign law is "repugnant" to the forum by reason of
the forum's evaluation of the claim which is recognized abroad, or whether the
court has rejected foreign law because, in the forum's view of what the im-
portant contacts are, local law should be applied. Only rarely do the reports
contain instances in which the forum's sole connection with litigation is serv-
ing as the place of trial. In most conflicts cases the domicil or the place of doing
11. Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. *1, *6 (1816).
12. See Beach, mtpra note 3.
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business of either plaintiff or defendant is in the forum. Discussion of cases
in which these contacts have seemed important has been reserved until later
in this paper.
II: THE CLASSICAL CONCEPT
Research into the case law establishes at least one solid fact: The reported
cases in which foreign law, applicable under the usually appropriate conflicts
rule, is not used solely because the law to be applied is "obnoxious" or "re-
pugnant" to the public policy of the forum are few indeed. Examples are much
easier to fabricate than to find in the reports.
The argument that an entirely foreign claim should not be enforced be-
cause it is repugnant to the forum has undoubtedly been made most often in
contract cases, but it has met with surprisingly little success. Greenwood v.
Curtis13 is certainly one of the more striking examples of the tolerance of
American courts for "repugnant" foreign contract claims. In that case, a
South Carolina domiciliary sold goods to the defendant in Africa in return
for a promise to deliver a quantity of slaves. Part of the slaves were delivered,
and the defendant stated an account as to the rest, translating the value of the
slaves into cash, so that the account stated said nothing about slaves. The
defendant then gave a note to the plaintiff's agent in Africa, translating the
debt back into slaves and promising to pay "nine four-foot slaves, thirty-seven
prime slaves," and a small sum of money. The note was to be paid in Africa
where the slave trade was legal. The plaintiff would then have transported
the slaves to South Carolina for sale, the trade being legal there too. De-
fendant failed to perform, and the plaintiff brought suit on the account stated
and on the note in Massachusetts. Defendant's counsel relied on a Massachu-
setts statute prohibiting the slave trade and on the contention that the slave
trade was a vicious and immoral practice in his argument that no relief should
be granted. The court stated that this objection "may apply" to the attempt to
recover on the note, but could not defeat the plaintiff's attempt to recover the
cash amount stated in the account, since the payment of cash is not immoral.
Both the dissent 14 and the annotator 15 point out that there never really was any
intention on the part of either party that the obligation be satisfied in cash, the
transaction clearly being one for the acquisition of slaves.
The idea that a court will enforce such a contract as long as it can keep
from turning itself into a flesh market also found acceptance in the Supreme
Court of Illinois in a suit to recover on a note given for the price of a slave.'0
13. 6 Mass. *358 (1810).
14. Id. at *366.
15. Id. at *358.
16. Roundtree v. Baker, 52 IIl. 241 (1869).
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Relief was granted even though Illinois had abolished slavery long before the
sale in Kentucky took place and even though the Civil War and the abolition of
slavery had intervened between the time of the transaction and suit. The court
indicated its abhorrence of slavery, stating that it would not specifically en-
force such a contract but that, since the slave had been delivered, it would en-
force payment of a note given for him.
It is curious that the sensibilities of the judiciary have been offended in
cases involving far less egregious violations of "some fundamental principle
of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradi-
tion of the common weal." A New Jersey court refused to grant an accounting
to a member of a partnership which carried on lotteries, even on the assump-
tion that all of the transactions involved occurred in states where they were
legal.17 The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas refused to grant recovery on
notes given for the purchase of stock in a Mexican gambling and liquor estab-
lishment.1 8 The prohibition laws of Texas and the United States were said to
set a public policy forbidding the enforcement of the notes even though the
notes were not alleged to be made or to be payable in the United States.' 9 Many
dicta can be added to these two cases, 20 but our research has revealed only one
other square holding that a state will refuse to enforce a contract because it
is obnoxious to it (although the argument has been made with great frequency)
when it has had no significant contact with the transaction or the parties.2'
17. Watson v. Murray, 23 N.J. Eq. 257 (Ch. 1872).
18. Ayub v. Saloman, 252 S.W. 291 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
19. It is possible that the outcome of this case was influenced by its companion case,
Ayub v. Automobile Mortgage Co., 252 S.W. 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923), in which the
notes were dated and payable in Texas. In this case, Texas clearly had the right to apply
its own law to test the validity of the transaction, and it did so. In the course of its decision,
the court reasoned that the prohibition laws of Texas and the United States established a pub-
lic policy which would be violated by enforcing the notes. Public policy was thus being used
in the local law sense, i.e., to determine whether the notes were enforceable under Texas'
local law. The court then carried its characterization of the prohibition laws as public
policy over to Ayub v. Saloman, note 18 sapra, this time -using public policy in the conflicts
sense, i.e., enforcement of the notes is repugnant to Texas and hence will be denied even
though Texas lacks significant contacts with the transaction. Cf. Matter of Clarkson, 201
Misc. 943, 107 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Surr. Ct. 1951), discussed in text at note 80 infra. Both Ayub
cases were reversed on appeal. Automobile Mortgage Co. v.. Ayub, 266 S.W. 134 (Tex.
1924) ; Ayub v. Saloman, 266 S.W. 136 (Tex. 1924).
20. E.g., Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 278 (1880) (dictum); Smith v. Union
Bank, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 518, 526 (1831) (dictum) ; Swarn v. Swann, 21 Fed. 299, 300
(E.D. Ark. 1884) (dictum); R. S. Barbee & Co. v. Bevins, Hopkins & Co., 176 Ky. 113,
115, 195 S.W. 154, 155 (1917) (dictum).
21. Continental Supply Co. v. Syndicate Trust Co., 52 N.D. 209, 202 N.W. 404 (1924),
in which the Supreme Court of North Dakota refused to enforce a stipulation in a note
providing for the payment of ten percent of interest and principal for attorney's fees in the
event that an attorney's services were necessary for collection. The note had been issued
in Texas, where such stipulations are lawful, but North Dakota had a statute expressly
declaring stipulations for attorney's fees "to be against public policy and void." The court
said, "It is elementary, however, that the doctrine of comity does not require the courts of
one state to enforce contracts made in another state when such contracts are contrary to
the public policy of the forum." Id. at 222, 202 N.W. at 409. Even in this case, however,
the defendant appears to have been a resident of the forum, and it is at least arguable that
1956]
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The argument that a foreign claim should not be enforced because of its
repugnant nature has not been limited to contract cases. In tort cases, how-
ever, it is rare that a grant of relief to an injured party can be considered re-
pugnant to morality or justice. But a tort claim may be based on a law differing
sharply from the law of the forum.
The problem of whether to refuse relief for a foreign tort has come up
more frequently in cases arising under foreign wrongful death acts than in any
other type of case. Some of the early death act cases refusing to apply foreign
law were clearly grounded in the notion that statutory law was local in char-
acter. It was urged that a statute had no extraterritorial effect and therefore
could not be enforced abroad.
[W]here the right of action does not exist except by reason of
statute, it can be enforced only in the state where the statute is in ex-
istence and where the injury has occurred. That is to say, the cause
of action must have arisen and the remedy must be pursued in the
same state, and that must be the state where the law was enacted and
has effect.'
The idea that statutory causes of action for tort are non-exportable seems
to be a curious corollary of Story's territorial theory of the nature of law. Leg-
the case is explicable in terms of Rabel's "public law" theory. See text at note 123 infra. Cf.
Campen Bros. v. Stewart, 106 W. Va. 247, 145 S.E. 381 (1928), in which the notes involved
were executed in the forum state. In Arden Lumber Co. v. Henderson Iron Works & Sup-
ply Co., 83 Ark. 240, 103 S.W. 185 (1907), and White-Wilson-Drew Co. v. Egelhoff, 96
Ark. 105, 131 S.W. 208 (1910), the Arkansas" court held that provisions for attorney's fees
were penalties and hence unenforceable even if valid under foreign law. Aim. STAT. ANN.
§ 68-910 (Supp. 1955) renders provisions for ten percent attorney's fees valid, in effect
overruling these two decisions.
Sally v. Bank of Union, 150 Ga. 281, 103 S.E. 460 (1920), should also be mentioned
here. In that case Georgia refused to hold a married woman liable upon her contract of
suretyship entered into in North Carolina, where such contracts are valid, on the ground
that to'do so would be contrary to Georgia's public policy. It does not appear whether the
defendant was a Georgia domiciliary or not. If she was, then clearly Georgia had a signifi-
cant connection with the transaction. See text at note 98 infra. If she was not, then the
case is a holding for the proposition that a state will refuse to enforce a contract repugnant
to it even though it lacks contacts with the case. Ulman, Magill & Jordan Woolen Co. v.
Magill, 155 Ga. 555, 117 S.E. 657 (1923), discussed in text at note 102 infra, a similar case
involving a nondomiciliary, regarded the Sally case as controlling. The Magill case had
at least a marginal contact in that property situated in Georgia was involved.
See also Kellogg-Citizen's Nat'l Bank v. Felton, 145 Fla. 68, 199 So. 50 (1940), in which
Florida refused to enforce the contract of a married woman, domiciled in Florida at the
time of the suit but not at the time of making the contract.
An enormous number of cases have refused to apply the public policy doctrine to
foreign contracts. E.g., Haase v. First Nat'l Bank, 203 Ala. 624, 84 So. 761 (1919) ; Veytla
v. Alvarez, 30 Ariz. 316, 247 Pac. 117 (1926) ; Henning v. Hill, 80 Ind. App. 363, 141 N.E.
66 (1923). Veytia v. Alvarez, supra, in which the plaintiff was suing for liquor sold and
delivered in Mexico, is especially well reasoned. For example, the court says, "Is there,
then,... anything inherently wicked, vicious, or immoral in this sale? Not unless our
ipse dixit makes it so. It may be that our pyohibition laws are expressive of our national
moral sense ... but their origin is in our own experience. Neither expressly nor by fair
implication do the laws condemn as inherently wicked the age-old customs of other peoples
in the use of intoxicating liquors." Veytia v. Alvarez supra at 329, 247 Pac. at 122.
22. Willis v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 61 Tex. 432, 434 (1884). An old treatise, RoRau,
AmmiczA INmsrTATE LAw (1879), is the fountain-head of this sort of argument. See Id.
at 155-56.
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islation can bind only within the territory of the state of enactment, and, there-
fore, it has no effect abroad. Story, of course, cannot be charged with this
particular point of view because his treatise did not speak to the problems of
choice of law in torts at all. The argument was made to the Supreme Court
of the United States in 1880, but, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller, the
Court disposed of the matter by pointing out that tort liability is generally
transitory and by characterizing the contention as a "very dangerous doc-
trine."23 The localization of tort litigation because the right of action was,
created by statute survives nowhere.
The late nineteenth century and early twentieth century cases exhibited
an analogous problem. A great many opinions took the position that the forum
can enforce a foreign death act claim only if the foreign act is substantially
similar to the local statute.2 The requirement of similarity could be made so
exacting as to forbid recovery under the foreign act unless the local statute
was almost identical to the sister state's statute. For example, St. Louis,
I. M. & S. Ry. v. McCormick,25 a Texas case of 1888, refused recovery on a
claim based on an Arkansas wrongful death act which differed from the Texas
law only on such matters as who might bring the action, the distribution of
the recovery, and whether or not exemplary damages might be awarded. The
dismissal of this plaintiff's claim is particularly startling because, on the facts of
the case, the identity of the plaintiff, the distribution of recovery, and the dam-
ages permitted would have remained the same no matter which act had been
used.
Time has drained the substantial similarity requirement of its vitality.28
In a few.states plaintiffs' counsel secured the passage of.legislation requiring
the local courts to entertain foreign causes of action .2  The landmark of Loucks
23. Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 11, 18 (1880); see Cincinnati, H. & D. R.R. v.
McMullen, 117 Ind. 439, 20 N.E.- 287 (1889) ; Morris v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., 65 Iowa
727, 23 N.W. 143 (1885).
24. See, generally, Hancock, TORTS IN TE CoNFLicT OF LAws 26-29 (1942); Rose,
Foreign Enforcement of Actions for Wrongful Death, 33 MicH. L. REv. 545 (1935). The
source of the similarity requirement seems to be Leonard v. Columbia Steam Nay. Co., 84
N.Y. 48 (1881).
25. 71 Tex. 660, 9 S.W. 540 (1888).
26. "At the present day [the similarity rule] . . . is probably retained only in Texas
and Maryland." HANCOCK, op. cit. supra note 24, at 29.
The Texas situation is discussed in Paulsen, Foreign Law in Texas Courts, 33 TEXAS
L. REv. 437, 439-49 (1955). Maryland's Davis v. Ruzicka, 170 Md. 112, 183 Atl. 569 (1936),
may be the most recent case in which a state refused to apply the law of a sister state on
dissimilarity grounds. Fifteen months after the decision Maryland passed a statute having
the effect of abolishing the dissimilarity rule in wrongful death cases. MD. ANN. CODE
art. 67, §S2 (1951). There is no Maryland authority which ever applied the rule to other
than a death act case.
27. E.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 97 (1940) : "Whenever, either by common law or
the statutes of another state, a cause of action, either upon contract, or in tort, has arisen
in such other state against any person or corporation, such cause of action shall be enforcible
in the courts of this state, in any county in which jurisdiction of the defendant can be legally
obtained in the same manner in which jurisdiction could have been obtained if the cause of
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v. Standard Oil Co. 2 8 is a splendid example of those opinions in which the
courts have done the work unassisted: "The test of similarity has been aban-
doned [in Massachusetts]. . . . If it has ever been accepted here, we think
it should be abandoned now."'29 In a few states the courts still play the game
of likeness and difference, but it is a game of shadow without substance. The
sister state statutes are always found to be similar to the local act.30 Only if
the- forum is procedurally unable to provide the remedy appropriate to the
foreign claim is the plaintiff's action dismissed.31
The requirement of similarity has almost nothing to recommend it and,
indeed, as between sister states is probably unconstitutional.P2 It does serve
as a check on the practice of forum shopping, but so would refusing to enforce
all foreign causes of action, and it is not nearly so flexible a device as the
straightforward use of forum non conveniens. The state of the tort is not
necessarily the best place of trial, and jurisdiction over the defendant may be
impossible to obtain there. Of course, the similarity rule was a valuable tool
in, the historical development of extra-state enforcement -of death act claims
when it was used to justify the taking of an out-of-state case. A cause of ac-
tion is obviously not "obnoxious" to the forum if that state entertains similar
actions locally. As a principle of exclusion, however, the similarity require-
ment may immunize a defendant from the consequences of his wrongdoing and
bar the plaintiff from his right to compensation.
action had arisen in this state"; see also Mo. ANN. STAT. § 507.020 (1952) ; TEX. Rzv. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 4678 (1952). The Texas statute is explained in Allen v. Bass, 47 S.W.2d
426_(Tex. Civ. App. 1932). A commentary on the Missouri legislation is found in Burg v.
Knox; 334 Mo. 329, 67 S.W.2d 96 (1933).
28. 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
29. Id. at 113, 120 N.E. at 202. The following are some of the leading cases which
indicate that a sister state cause of action in tort must be enforced in the forum unless re-
pugnant to good morals or natural justice: Northern Pac. R.R. v. Babcock, 154 U.S. 190
(189,4) ; Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Reddin, 128 F.2d 787 (8th Cir..1942); Rubin v.
Schupp, 127 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1942) ; Curtis v. Campbell, 76 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1935) ;
Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 234 N.W. 314 (1931) ; Herrick v. Minneapolis &St. L. Ry., 31 Minn. 11, 16 N.W. 413 (1883) (perhaps the most widely cited case of this
group); Miller v. Tennis, 140 Okla. 185, 282 Pac. 345 (1929) ; Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v,
McIntire, 29 Okla. 797, 119 Pac. 1008 (1911) ; Richardson v. Pacific Power & Light Co.,
11 Wash. 2d 288, 118 P.2d 985 (1941); Reynolds v. Day, 79 Wash. 499, 140 Pae. 681
(1914) ; Bain v. Northern Pac. Ry., 120 Wis. 412, 98 N. W. 241 (1904).
Maryland v. Coard, 175 Va. 571, 9 S.E.2d 454 (1940), is especially interesting. In a
wrongful death action arising from Maryland facts the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia held that the Virginia courts should provide a forum even though that court as-
sumed that Maryland would refuse to decide a similar Virginia case:
And while the rule of comity rests in a measure upon the custom of reciprocity,
we do not understand that it by any means is founded solely, or even chiefly, upon
such custom, but rather upon what appear to be the just rights of the parties
litigant. Id. at 579, 9 S.E.2d at 457.
30. Tyson v. Scartine, 118 A.2d 795 (Del. Super. Ct. 1955), is a recent example.
31. Texas refuses to apply the Mexican negligence law on that ground. See Carter v.
Tillery, 257 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953), and the discussion in Paulsen, supra note
26, at 439-49.
32. See text at note 171 infra.
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Among the tort cases other than those involving death acts; Hudson v.: Von
Harm3 and Jacobsen v. Saner34 stand alone (so far 'as our research has
revealed) as instances in which astate,'unconnected with the case by any sig-
nificant factual contact, has refused r&covery on the ground that the applicable
law is at odds with the forum's policy.
In Hudson, a resident of California (at the time of suit- but not at the
time of injury) sued a resident of Hawaii in, the California courts for injuries
caused by the defendant's son. Hawaii was the place of the injury, and under
a Hawaiian statute a father is responsible for the torts of his children but not
so in California. The California: courts refused to entertain the action "on
account of the conflict of law which exists between the forum and the foreign
territory.13 5 The Hudson opinion does not rest on the idea that the vidarious
liability of the parent imposed by the Hawaiian law is immoral, nor does it
contain any expression which indicates- that recovery would be considered
fundamentally unjust. The essay is based upon two misstatements of law as
far as actual case holdings are concerned:
[T]he decisions of the courts of America seem to be in harmony
to the effect that when the Positive law of the forum, represented by
its constitution, statutes or current decisions is in substantial conflict
with the law of the foreign state, country, or territory, upon the sub-
ject matter in controversy, the courts of the forum will decline to ac-
cept jurisdiction without violation of the doctrine of the comity of
nations.36
The court was also persuaded that in a majority of states the doctrine of sub-
stantial similarity is accepted as to statutory causes of action. The "substan-
tial conflict" paraphrase of the public policy doctrine is peculiar, like the more
commonly used public policy formulation, to cases in which the forum has
some contact with the transaction before it. The authorities do not support its
use where the transaction has no contacts with the forum. We have already
seen that the substantial similarity rule is defunct except for an occasional
dictum 3 7 It is difficult, on the facts as reported in the opinion, to see what
policy of California is served by the decision. Its only accomplishment was to
deny a California resident the right to recover for an injury which would have
been the basis of compensation in Hawaii.
It is not surprising that the case, so ill considered and so hostile to those
deserving of compensation, has not attracted a following. The California Su-
preme Court refused to extend Hudson in Loranger v. Nadeau,38 which in-
33. 85 Cal. App. 323, 259 Pac. 374 (1927).
34. 72 N.W.2d 900 (Iowa 1955).
35. 85 Cal. App. at 332, 259 Pac. at 378.
36. Id. at 331, 259 Pac. at 378.
37. See text at note 26 supra.
38. 215 Cal. 362, 10 P.2d 63 (1932).
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volved a negligence action. by an automobile passenger against the driver for
injuries resulting from an Oklahoma accident. The California Legislature had
enacted a guest statute which provided that no person who as a guest accepted
a ride in any vehicle upon a highway had any right to action for civil damages
against the driver unless he established gross negligence. The defendant, citing
Hudson v. Von Haem, argued that there was a "substantial conflict" between
California and Oklahoma law and that therefore the California court should
dismiss the case. The California Supreme Court disagreed, asserting that in
taking jurisdiction the courts did not violate any fundamental principle of
justice or public policy. The court reasoned that California law had been the
same as Oklahoma law before the enactment of the California guest statute,
and, furthermore, even with the guest statute, California recognized liability
of a host to his guest for some injuries caused by negligence. Courts in other
states have reached California's solution to the guest statute problem.89
Jacobsen v. Saner40 is an example of a state's refusal to enforce ,a cause
of action not because the forum is fundamentally opposed to the claim but
rather because the forum is opposed to the claimant. As a result of the alleged
acts of Saner while he lived in Minnesota, Mrs. Jacobsen filed a proceeding
for divorce against Jacobsen, which was granted in Minnesota by default.
Saner moved to Iowa where a statute provides, "When a divorce is decreed
the guilty party forfeits all rights acquired by marriage." Under the Iowa
decisional law this statute bars the guilty party from prosecuting an action for
alienation of affections, at least when that person is divorced in Iowa. Mr.
Jacobsen's petition seeking damages for alienation of affections was dismissed
and the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed. The statute as interpreted by the
cases was "a clear and positive statement of the public policy of the state and
the 'comity' rule is not applicable."41 Near the beginning of the opinion "com-
ity" was defined as "merely a principle in accordance with which the courts
of one state will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another, not as
a matter of right but out of deference and respect."42 The case might serve as a
good example for Judge Beach's complaint that much harm has come from
the use of that term "comity."
The Iowa court was unwilling to limit the effect of the statute to Iowa
39. Skillman v. Comer, 38 Del. 402, 193 At. 563 (1937); Redfern v. Redfern, 212
Iowa 454, 236 N.W. 399 (1931) ; Pool v. Day, 141 Kan. 195, 40 P.2d 396 (1935) ; Hall
v. Hamel, 244 Mass. 464, 138 N.E. 925 (1923) ; Eskovitz v. Berger, 276 Mich. 536, 268
N.W. 883 (1936) ; Whitney v. Penrod, 149 Neb. 636, 32 N.W.2d 131 (1948) ; Brown v.
Hogan, 14 Tenn. App. 251 (1931). The argument that public policy forbids application
of the guest statute in force at the place of the injury was rejected in Pringle v. Gibson,
135 Me. 297, 195 At1. 695 (1937) ; Kaiser v. North, 292 Mich. 49, 289 N.W. 325 (1939).
40. 72 N.W.2d 900 (Iowa 1955).
41. Id. at 901.
42. Ibid.
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divorces because non-residents would then have a forum for alienation of af-
fections recovery when residents would not. But it is often the-case that occur-
rences outside the state will be ground for relief when similar happenings inside
will not. What advantages does Iowa gain by barring non-residents from
remedies which they could have in another state, even granting that the remedy
will be given in the face of the inability of Iowa domiciliaries to obtain similar
relief? The Iowa court concedes that the law of another state would control
the question but for the public policy principle, and so the ideal of equality
between resident and non-resident is purchased at the price of denying a rem-
edy for what, by the admittedly applicable law, is a very real wrong.
We have been dealing thus far with cases in which courts have refused to
take jurisdiction because to do so would violate the forum's public policy.
There is, in addition, authority for the proposition that public policy can be used
by the plaintiff to strike down a defense even though the forum has no contact
with the transaction before it. In Fox v. Postal Tel. Cable Co.,43 Wisconsin
was the forum for a claim resulting from de1ayed delivery of a telegram from
New York to Illinois. The telegraph blank contained language both saving
the company harmless for delay in transmission and limiting its liability for
such delay in special circumstances. "[T] he fact, if it be a fact, that an action
on the claimed liability could not be maintained in the courts of New York or
those of Illinois . . ." was held not to control. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
refused to dismiss the action because the stipulation in the telegraph blank was
invalid under Wisconsin common law "supposed to be reasonably necessary
for the protection of our citizens and all persons submitting to our laws or
invoking their aid through the instrumentality of our courts." 4 The court
believed that, "[C]ourts have uniformly regarded the public policy of the
place of the forum as superseding the right of a defendant to the benefit of a
defense which he might have at the place of the contract. . ."45 It was ap-
parently felt that this proposition was so widely accepted that it needed no
citation to support it.
In one famous-instance, however, the Court of Appeals of New York re-
fused to ignore a racist decree of Nazi Germany.46 Plaintiff, a Jew, sued the de-
43. 138 Wis. 648, 120 N.W. 399 (1909). Holderness v. Hamilton Fire Ins. Co., 54
F. Supp. 145 (S.D. Fla. 1944); Jeffrey v. Whitworth College, 128 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.
Wash. 1955) ; Williamson v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 221 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1955), are
cases refusing to strike down defenses on the ground of public policy.
In Aboitzy & Co. v. Price, 99 F. Supp. 602 (D. Utah 1951), Judge Willis Ritter re-
fused to recognize a Japanese wartime regulation in the Philippines forbidding loans of
money to Americans held captive. The loans were made to give the prisoner money which
enabled him to survive his imprisonment., The judge feared that to recognize the defense
might discourage other lenders at another time and penalize brave and loyal friends. The
effect of the decision was to require payment by the prisoner after the war.
44. 138 Wis. at 653, 120 N.W. at 401.
45. Ibid.
46. Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E.2d 798 (1938);
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fendant German corporation on a German contract to be performed by plain-
tiff's services in Germany. The plaintiff alleged as his first cause of action
discharge from his employment and asked damages in the amount of $50,000.
The company responded that it, was forced to discharge the plaintiff by the
non-Aryan decrees of the Hitler'regime. The argument that New York should
not consider the effect of these unjust provisions was met by the proposition
that New York was not competent tq review the actions of the German gov-
ernment applicable within its own territory "however objectionable" the action
might be. If "natural justice" is to be reason for refusing to look to foreign law,
it is hard to imagine a more suitable'case for the application of the doctrine.
An appealing case can be made to support the proposition that a state
should be able to override ordinarily applicable foreign law in the name of
justice.4 7 The giving of remedies in the light of out-of-state law may not be
the fairest way to dispose of controversy. Our courts properly should deny
effect to a foreign contract of slavery or an agreement to subvert the integrity of
the governmental processes of a friendly foreign government. 48 In a world in
which despotic governments exist, our courts should not become the hand-
maidens of tyrants. Yet if we admit a principle of reservation from the normal
choice of law rules on the grounds of fundamental ideas of justice, we must
'also assert such cases almost never arise to be decided on this ground alone.
Indeed, as we have just seen, when they do arise our courts have some-
times refused to disregard the most brutal foreign law provisions imaginable.
III. THE CHOICE OF LAW FUNCTION
A favorite bete noir of some conflict of laws commentators, the alleged
provincialism of American courts in refusing to recognize in one state a mark-
edly different or objectionable cause of action centered wholly in another state,
thus finds little support in the cases. If in an attempt to understand the role
of public policy we return to consider some of the other commentators, we find
"public policy" cast in a wholly different light. In 1924 Professor Lorenzen
wrote, "The notion that the rules of the Conflict of Laws can be derived from
some general formula or theory is responsible for another doctrine-that of
cf. Bloch v. Basler, Lebens-Versicherungs Gesellschaft, 73 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct. 1947);
David v. Veitscher, Magnesitweske Gesellschaft, 348 Pa. 335.35 A.2d 346 (1944).
47. See Bodenheimer, The Public Policy Exception in Private International Lazo:
A Reappraisal in the Light of Legal Philosophy, 12 SEMINAR 51, 63-66 (1954).
48. Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261 (1880), contains a famous dictum: "[A]
contract to bribe or corruptly influence officers of a foreign government will not be en-
forced in the courts of this country,-not from any consideration of the interests of that
government or any regard for its policy, but from the inherent viciousness of the transac-
tion, its repugnance to our morality, and the pernicious effect which its enforcement by
our courts would have upon our people." Id. at 277.
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'public policy.' "49 Professor Cavers placed the public policy. exception'in his
list of avenues of escape for courts wishing to do justice rather than to follow
mechanical choice of law rules.50 Professor Nussbaum, in speaking of whether
the public policy doctrine will be used, gives us an important insight: "[A]ll
depends oki the circumstances, or, more precisely, on the importance of the
'contacts' of thexase with the territory of the forum."5 1
In short, "public policy" is one way to avoid the application of a choice of
law rule which the forum wishes to avoid. The objection of the forum, thus, is
not to the content of the foreign law but to its-own choice of law rule. Rather
than to change or modify the supposedly applicable rule the court may refuse
on public policy grounds to apply the law to which the rule makes reference.
The closer the tie between the forum and the facts -of a given transaction the
more readily we may expect the forum to use its own law to judge the matter
before it. In such a view the "public policy" doctrine becomes a kind of choice
of law principle, imprecise, uncertain of application, but, nevertheless discharg-
ing a choice of law function. It is a way of saying, "In these circumstances this
forum makes reference to its internal law rather than to the Jaw of another state
to which our 'normal' choice of law rule would direct us."
The overwhelming number of cases which have rejected foreign' law on,
public policy grounds are cases with which the forum had some important
connection. .It is apparent, then, that in most cases the choice of local rather
thanforeign law cannot be regarded simply as a matter of parochialism. The
common invocation of the public policy argument to defeat a foreign claim is a
denial that foreign law should govern at all and an assertion of the forum's
right to have its law applied to the transaction because of the forum's relation-
ship to it.
49. Lorenzeni, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J.
736, 746 (1924). -
50. See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. Rsv. 173, 183
(1933).
51. Nussbaum, Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws, 49 YALE
L.J. 1027, 1031 (1940). "Practically all of the, English and American public policy cases
exhibit a 'weighing' of the contacts involved." Id. at 1031 n.28. See LLOYD, PUBLIC POLICY
83-84 (1953) : "In considering whether a foreign contract is to be struck at on ground [sic]
of public policy it would seem natural that the court should have regard not so much to
the nature of the foreign rule. . . but to the consequences which result or which are likely
to result from its application. From this point of view it is obviously of cardinal impor-
tance to see whether the agreement involves or contemplates any activity within the coun-
try in which the court determining the dispute is situated. For a court may well take dif-
ferent views of the policy applicable in a case where an agreement is entirely unconnected
with its own jurisdiction and in one where the agreement is made or involves the effecting
of its purpose within that jurisdiction." The fifth chapter of Mr. Lloyd's book is entitled
"Public Policy in Private International Law."
Public policy has been given as a reason to refuse application of out of state law when
the forum obviously felt the foreign state did not have sufficient contact with the parties to
bind them by the law in question. Siegmann v. Meyer, 100 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1938). "New
York will. not recognize as a model for any liability which she will impoie, a liability im-
posed by another state upon an absentee non-resident." Id. at 368; cf. Dalton v. McLean,
137 Me. 4, 14 A.2d 13 (1940) (retroactive statute of state of tort not applied in forum)'.
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A. Situs of Property
The use of "public policy" as a choice of law device can be seen clearly
in a series of property cases in which the forum is also the situs. The cases
share an assumption that a law other than situs law is applicable to solve the
problems with which they deal; yet, occasionally, a court will wish to apply
situs law and will justify its choice on grounds of public policy. One group of
such cases involves security interests in personalty.
In Mackey v. Pettijohn5 2 a Missouri domiciliary executed in Missouri a
mortgage of movables located in Kansas to a Kansas domiciliary. A suit was
instituted in Kansas against the mortgagee to have him declared a trustee for
the benefit of creditors on the theory that Missouri law converted the mort-
gage into an assignment for the benefit of creditors. Kansas law would permit
the mortgagee to retain the property for his own benefit. The court first came
out squarely for the principle that Kansas law should govern the mortgage
because the property was located there, the mortgagee was a Kansas resident,
and the mortgage was to be performed there. But, unfortunately, it did not
stop there, going on to say:
The rule of decision in the State of Missouri cannot be permitted to
have application to this contract in the State of Kansas, because it
contravenes the policy of the State of Kansas . . . and is in conflict
with the express statute of the State. Our statute is, in effect, that a
chattel mortgage made by a resident of another state, on property
situated in this State, when filed in the office of the register of deeds
' . ' is a valid mortgage, and gives notice to all the world. . . . To
allow the rule of decision in Missouri to prevail here would be to over-
turn our own policy with respect to mortgages on personal property,
and to render nugatory the provision of our statute.53
There is not a doubt in the world that the Kansas statute relied upon was
never intended to apply to this problem. Its obvious purpose was to require
recordation of chattel mortgages on property located within the state in order
to provide notice to third parties of the mortgagee's interest, and not to provide
that if the law of the place where a mortgage is made declares it to be a gen-
eral assignment, that law should not be applied in Kansas. The public policy
talk here serves to apply situs law in fact, but shifts responsibility to the leg-
islature for refusing to apply the law of the place in which the mortgage was
made.
Public policy language substituting bombastic localism for analysis is well
illustrated in Chambers v. Consolidated Garage CoY4 In that case the conditional
52. 6 Kan. App. 57, 49 Pac. 636 (1897).
53. Id. at 60, 49 Pac. at 637 (text in unofficial reporter slightly different).
54. 210 S.W. 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919), aff'd, 111 Tex. 293, 231 S.W. 1072 (1921).
See Willys-Overland Co. v. Chapman, 206 S.W. 978 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918), for a similar
treatment of the same problem.
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vendee of an automobile wrongfully took the car from California, where the
conditional sale was made, to Texas and there sold it to a bona fide purchaser
for value. The vendor exercised due diligence in trying to locate the car and,
immediately upon discovering what had happened, instituted proceedings in
Texas to recover it. Under California law the vendor's interest in the auto-
mobile is superior to that of subsequent bona fide purchasers without filing
or recordation; under Texas law it is not. The problem before the court was
not an easy one. California had important contacts with the controversy: the
conditional sale took place there; the automobile was located in California at
the time; and the conditional vendor was a California corporation. Texas,
too, had significant connections with the case: the second purchase was made
there, the property was located in Texas at the time, and the purchaser was a
resident of Texas. If the conditional vendor were to contend that a decision for
the purchaser would mean that there is no way for the vendor to protect him-
self short of recordation in every state requiring recordation for perfection,
the purchaser could answer that a decision for the lienor would mean that there
would be no way for the purchaser to protect himself short of checking the
records in every state, and even that would not have sufficed in this case since
California does not require recordation of conditional sales contracts.
It is clear that Texas could have applied either its own or California law
and justified the result in accordance with an ordinary reference to situs law.55
It is equally clear that the court of civil appeals was not addressing itself to the
problem when it said:
In our opinion the settled policy of Texas jurisprudence has sternly
frowned upon and set its face against'the enforcement, against inno-
cent purchasers for value, of secret undisclosed liens upon and reser-
vations of title to personalty, the possession of which has been volun-
tarily surrendered and the possessor clothed with apparent full and
unincumbered title. . . . Shall the courts of Texas recognize and ex-
tend to citizens of California rights which are denied to its own citi-
zens and which prejudice the interests of innocent citizens of Texas ?56
If that is the test, foreign law that differs from forum law will never be applied
when to do so would be to the disadvantage of residents of the forum.
55. Cf. Olivier v. Townes, 2 Mart. (n.s.) *93 (La. 1824). The significance of the
situs contact is well illustrated by Personal Finance Co. v. General Finance Co., 133 Pa.
Super. 582, 3 A.2d 174 (1938), where a New York chattel mortgagee prevailed over a
Pennsylvania corporation which was the holder of a later acquired security interest in the
same chattel. Both the mortgagee and the Pennsylvania corporation had acquired their
interests in New York while the chattel was located there. The court rejected the public
policy contention of the Pennsylvania corporation and distinguished an earlier Pennsylvania
case upholding. a creditor who attached in Pennsylvania over a New York chattel mort-
gagee, saying, "Upon entry into our borders, the chattel, although previously validly
mortgaged in another state, becomes subject to our laws." Id. at 586, 3 A.2d at 176. Since
the chattel in the Personal Finance Co. case was never in Pennsylvania, to enforce the
plaintiff's claim would not violate Pennsylvania's public policy.
56. 210 S.W. at 567.
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The Texas courts have reacted in the same way even where filing is neces-
sary under the law of the place where the security was given and the filing
requirements were met.57 Only filing in Texas can protect the security holder
against a bona fide purchase made in Texas.- If thE Texas courts had faced the
problem squarely and evolved a meaningful choice of law rule, even if that
resulted in the -application of Texas law, perhaps we would have been spared
the spectacle of the Supreme Court of Wyoming, which had held that a security
interest valid in the state where given is superior to the interest of a Wyoming
bona fide purchaser, refusing to apply that rule in favor of a Texas chattel
mortgageeP58 The Wyoming court was admirably reluctant to "limit the doc-
trine' of comity," but felt obliged to retaliate against the parochialism of the
Texas courts.
Texas' public policy method of disposing of this question also came home
to roost in the famous case of Forgan v. Bainbridge0 in which the Supreme
Court of Arizona had to decide whether an Illinois chattel mortgagee should
prevail over a Texas bona fide purchaser.* In cases in which Arizona had had to
decide whether an Arizona purchaser would defeat a foreign mortgagee,
Arizona had held for the foreign mortgagee. In such cases, however, Arizona
is free to apply her own law or the law of the place of the mortgage transaction
because she has a substantial connection with the transaction-the sale and the
situs of the chattel at the time of the sale being in the state. When she has no
connection with the transaction, it can at least be argued that she should look
to the law of the place in which the sale took place and apply the law to which
that law refers. Thus, the argument would run, she should have looked to
Texas law, and when Texas referred to her own law for the result, should
have applied Texas law. But the reasoning of the Texas cases looking to
Texas law for the solution of this problem is generally unpersuasive, and so it
was easy for the Arizona court to accept the Wyoming retaliatory principle:
[W]hen a sister state does not recognize and will not enforce in her
courts our rule of law in regard to a certain class of contracts having
their inception in this state, we are not required under the doctrine of
comity to enforce similar contracts according to her rule, when such
rule is directly opposed to our public 
policy.6 F
The Arizona court, in upholding the Illinois mortgagee, committed the
57. E.g., Farmer v. Evans, 111 Tex. 283, 233 S.W. 101 (1921) ; Best v. Farmers' &
Merchants' Bank, 141 S.W. 334 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
58. Union Securities Co. v. Adams, 33 Wyo. 45, 236 Pac. 513 (1925). It is only fair
to point out, however, that not all of the Texas opinions on this subject are as weak as that
of the court of civil appeals in Chambers v. Consolidated Garage Co. For example, the
Supreme Court of Texas, in affirming that decision, makes some attempt at analysis. See
Chambers v. Consolidated Garage Co., 111 Tex. 293, 231 S.W. 1072 (1921).
59. 34 Ariz. 408, 274 Pac. 155 (1928).
60. Id. at 415-16, 274 Pac. at 158.
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same sin as the Texas courts, resting the decision in part on Arizona public
policy rather than basing the result squarely on a reasoned defense of the
proposition that the place where the mortgage was given has the greatest right
to have its law applied.
A group of older cases involves general assignments. A financially embar-
rassed debtor has executed a general assignment at his domicil in State X;
the assignment purports to convey to the assignee for the benefit of creditors
all property of the debtor wherever situated and contains a provision valid
under the law of State X preferring certain creditors out of the proceeds of the
assigned property; the debtor owns personalty in the state of the forum, and
subsequent to the making of the assignment this personalty has been attached
by a non-preferred creditor. When the assignee intervenes claiming the prop-
erty under the assignment, the attaching creditor concedes that normally the
law of the place of making governs a transfer of personalty executed at the
place of the owner's domicil but argues that to recognize the interest of the
assignee here would contravene the forum's public policy because general as-
signments containing preferences are invalid under the forum's law. Many
states will sustain the attaching creditor in this contention, at least if he is a
citizen of the forum. 61
The same basic fact situation occasionally appears where the property
attached is realty. Thus, in Williams v. Kemper, Hundley & McDonald Dry
Goods Co.,6 2 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated:
[I] f the deed of assignment meets all the requirements of a deed of
conveyance in the country where the land is situated, it will convey
whatever of interest the assignor has. This rule is subject to the same
exceptions that apply to personal property. If the deed of assignment
is in its general effect repugnant to the law of the jurisdiction where
the land is situated, it will be void as against creditors residing in the
state or territory where the land is situated .... 13
The difference between this kind of case and those discussed in Section II is
61. Authorities on this subject are collected in Annot., 111 A.L.R. 787 (1937) ; Annot.,
23 L.R.A. 33 (1894) ; see GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWs 488-90 (3d ed. 1949) ; MINOR, CON-
FLIcr OF LAWs 14 (1901); cf. Dearing v. McKinnon Dash & Hardware Co., 165 N.Y.
78, 58 N.E. 773 (1900). The assignment for the benefit of creditors was frequently used
by insolvent debtors in the years before the adoption of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
30 STAT. 544, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1952). It is still occasionally resorted to, but fev
modern general assignment cases involve the problem discussed in the text. This is prob-
ably because such a problem cannot arise under the Bankruptcy Act, which confers upon
the trustee in bankruptcy title to the debtor's property wherever located, 30 STAT. 565
(1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1952), and, of course, that federal mandate cannot
be overridden by state lav.- Consequently, when an embarrassed debtor owns property in
a state other than his home or place of doing business, sound counseling dictates use of the
Bankruptcy Act rather than the general assignment in order to avoid the problem dis-
cussed in the text. The cases are, nevertheless, important for the light they shed upon the
use of the public policy doctrine.
62. 4 Okla. 145, 43 Pac. 1148 (1896).
63. Id. at 154, 43 Pac. at 1151.
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readily apparent: the forum here has a substantial connection with the question
before it because the property in issue is located within its boundaries. Indeed,
it is a connection of sufficient dignity that the Supreme Court of the United
States has held that it is a denial of full faith and credit for a state in which a
transfer of property is made and in which the parties involved are domiciled
to ignore a subsequent attachment at the situs.64 It is now generally recognized
that it is the law of the situs of personalty that controls its disposition, 0 and
this, has long been so with respect to realty. 6 Often, however, at least with
respect to movables, the situs' conflict of laws rule will be applied and that rule
may look to the law of the place of transfer or the transferor's domicil for the
governing law.67 It should be emphasized that that law is arrived at not by a
determination that the law of the domicil or the place of transfer is the "proper
law," but by a reference to situs law, which in turn refers to the law of the
domicil or the place of transfer. In effect, the situs in making its choice of law
rule recognizes that, at least where personalty is involved, the mere fact of
location is not terribly significant and that it may be better in certain circum-
stances to refer to the law of a state having a closer connection with the trans-
action involved. But this does not negate the fact that no violence is done to
traditional conflicts conceptions if, in some situations, the situs elects to apply
its own rather than some other law. And, in fact, this is all that has happened
in the general" assignment cases. Where the attaching creditor is a citizen of
the forum, a number of courts apparently are of the view that this gives the
forum a sufficient interest to warrant referring to the law of the situs rather
than to the law of some other place. Absent a local creditor, some courts will
defer to the law of the place of making; others reason that it would be an
unfair discrimination to refuse to accord to out-of-state creditors the same
rights accorded to local citizens and will consequently permit attack by any
creditor but a citizen of the state in which the assignment was made.08
That the problem presented by these cases is really being resolved in
accordance with orthodox choice of law principles is especially well illustrated
by Guillander v. Howell.69 In that case a preferential general assignment was
made in New York, where it was valid, and included movables in New Jersey.
A creditor in New Jersey, where a preferential assignment is invalid, attached
the movables there and bought them when they were sold to satisfy his claim.
The assignee brought an action for conversion in New York against the at-
64. Green v. Van Buskirk, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 307 (1866); Green v. Van Buskirk,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 139 (1868).
65. See GOODRICH, CoNrncT oF LAws 470 (3d ed. 1949).
66. See id. at 453.
67. See Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 H&Av. L. R v. 1165, 1195 (1938).
68. See note 61 supra.
69. 35 N.Y. 657 (1866).
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taching creditor. The Court of Appeals of New York denied recoyery, pointing
out that the property is within New Jersey's "exclusive jurisdiction: She pro-
tects and regulates it; though we may differ as to the policy or principles of
her laws, we must admit their validity."70 If New Jersey's refusal to uphold
the assignment against subsequent attaching creditors was an abandonment of
ordinary choice of law principles in favor of her own policy, as were the cases
discussed in Section II, we would not expect to see the highest court of the state
in which the assignment was made and the assignor domiciled accepting New
Jersey law as controlling.7'1
Why do the courts of the situs find it necessary to rely on public policy
reasoning? First, public policy can serve as a substitute for thinking. Every
law teacher has at one time or another, in response to the question, "Why this
result?" been met with, "For public policy reasons 1" Notwithstanding our
efforts, it is reasonable to suppose that the intellectual laziness occasionally
demonstrated by students will occasionally be demonstrated by judges. For
example, the question presented by the general assignment cases is not an easy
one. Many factors may be relevant to a determination of what law should gov-
ern the validity of a general assignment. A court can choose the law of the
place in which the assignment was made, which is also usually the place of the
debtor's domicil; it can choose the law of the place in which the property in-
volved is located or the law of the domicil or place of doing business of the
attacking creditor; it can even look beyond the assignment transaction and in-
quire into the law of the place where the debt owing to the attacking creditor
70. Id. at 660.
71. The assignment for the benefit of creditors must be distinguished from transfers
made pursuant to state insolvency laws and assignments compelled by a court. The com-
monly stated rule that transfers or assignments of personal property are governed by the
law of the place in which the transfer is made unless contrary to the policy of the state
where the property is situated applies only to voluntary assignments and not to assign-
ments by operation of law or those made under legal compulsion. Cases involving trans-
fers of the latter type almost universally hold that the assignee does not prevail against
subsequent attaching creditors even if they are not residents of the forum. E.g., Catlin v.
Wilcox Silver Plate Co., 123 Ind. 477, 24 N.E. 250 (1890) ; Sturtevant v. Armsby Co.,
66 N.H. 557,23 Atl. 368 (1891). Whether the forum has a similar insolvency law or not is
immaterial. See authorities collected in Annot., 23 A.L.R. 33 (1894). The theory of the
insolvency law cases is based on a territoriality of laws rationale: the statute compelling
the transfer operates only on property of the debtor within the state. Nevertheless, most
courts hold that residents of the state in which the insolvency assignment occurred cannot
prevail over the assignee as to the property in another state. E.g., Einer v. Beste, 32 Mo. 240
(1862); Hoag v. Hunt, 21 N.H. 106 (1950). Contra, McClure v. Campbell, 71 Wis.
350 (1888).
The insolvency law cases are unimportant now because state insolvency laws have been
held to be suspended by the federal Bankruptcy Act. International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278
U.S. 261 (1929). But there are some cases which fail to make the distinction between
general assignments and insolvency transfers and subordinate the assignee under a general
assignment to local creditors even though the assignment cannot be said to be contrary
to the forum's public policy. -In other words, the assignment will be treated as invalid
against local creditors even though if the assignment had been made in the forum it would
defeat them. E.g., Heyer v. Alexander, 108 III. 385 (1884) ; Happy v. Prickett, 24 Wash-
290, 64 Pac. 528 (1901).
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arose. The de facto solution.bf a majority of courts that have. considered the
problem .is to accord-greatest weight to a combination of situs and attacking
creditor's domicil: if both of those contacts are in the same state, its law will
govern the validity of the assignment. Where the attacking creditor's domicil
is the same as the place of making, that combination will control and the law of
that state will be applied. Where the attacking creditor's domicil is different
from both the situs and the debtor's domicil and the place of making, the
authorities are split, some holding the law of the situs to be controlling, others
deferring to the law of the debtor's domicil and the place of making.7 2 The
cases never inquire into the law of the attacking creditor's domicil unless it is
the same as the debtor's or the situs; nor do the cases ever, look beyond the
assignment for other possible contacts. In any event, it should be clear that
the problem is a relatively complex one requiring some intellectual exertion
for its solution. Unfortunately, that exertion has often been evaded by recourse
to public policy theorizing.
Second, public policy can serve as a means of shifting responsibility for a
decision. The statement, "Public policy requires," has an aura of predestination
that cannot be matched by "I decide." This is especially so when the source of
public policy is found in a statute. Thus, in the general assignment cases, the
court may refer to the local statute prohibiting preferences in assignments to
find that the state's public policy is contrary to preferences. The court is tossing
the ball to the legislature, even though it is probable that the legislators never
considered the problem of whether the statute should apply to assignments
made in other states.73
Third, the opinions seem to reveal that public policy is a term of greater
intensity than "our law." The fact that "our law" is different from the law of
the place having all the contacts with this transaction is not enough to warrant
a holding that foreign law should not be applied; the transaction must be
against public .policy. Greater intensity is needed when a court feels that it is
reaching a result that is contrary to generally operative principles.1 4 Looking
72. See note£1 supra.
73. See note 78 infra.
74. The proposition that "public policy" is a loaded term, a term of stronger content
-than something like "our law," should not be confused with Hoff's intensity principle. See
Hoff, The Intensity Principle in the Conflict of Laws, 39 VA. L. R v. 437 (1953). Hoff
there takes the position that courts should .not and occasionally do not restrict themselves
-to evaluating the significance of the various contacts which a transaction may have with
,more than one jurisdiction, but should and occasionally do take into account the comparative
force or intensity of the laws of the jurisdictions with which the transaction is connected.
"If a court finds little or no difference between the significance of the competing connecting
-ties, but does find a marked difference in the strength of the competing rules, it should then
-decide the, case by the legal order containing the stronger rule in point." Id. at 438. It is
readily apparent that this is something very different from our guess about the psychological
impact of the phrase "public policy." It should be pointed out in passing, however, that
some of the public policy cases do tend to support Hoff's thesis. Hoff cites Milliken v.
Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878). He might have added, e.g., Medway.v.,'Needham, 16 Mass.
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again to the general assignment cases, the customary practice in chattel transfer
cases is for the situs to look to the law of the domicil or of the place of transfer;
a refusal to make the reference must be justified on public policy grounds. A
reasoned retreat from the choice of law rule governing ordinary chattel trans-
fers in favor of a different rule when a unique kind of transfer-the general
assignment-is involved, apparently will not suffice.75
B. Trusts
Determining what law shall govern the 'validity and incidents of a trust
when more than one state has significant connections with it is a problem that
has given courts some difficulty. And, not surprisingly, public policy argu-
mentation has crept in from time to time. It is only fair to say, though, that
the courts have more dutifully stayed close to the real problem in this area than
in others previously discussed, rejecting public policy contentions as often as
not.76 The outcome of several cases apparently has, however, been affected by
the public policy doctrine, and we must turn our attention to those to see
whether they should properly be classed with cases in which public policy talk
merely serves as a screen for a choice of law decision.
In Hutchison v. Ross,7 7 the Court of Appeals of New York had to decide
whether an inter vivos trust with its contacts scrambled between New York
and Canada was valid when New York law would uphold it and Canadian law
would strike it down. The settlor and beneficiaries were Canadian citizens and
residents; the securities constituting the trust property were located in New
York at the time the trust instrument was executed and thereafter, and so was
the trustee; the trust instrument was executed in Canada, but the trustee's
agreement to act as trustee took place in New York. The court carefully con-
sidered the significance of the various contacts and decided that the situs of
*157(1819) ; King v. Klemp, 26 N.J. Misc. 140, 57 A.2d 530 (Ch. 1947) ; Case v. Dodge,
18 R.I. 661, 29 Atl. 785 (1894).
75. See Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J.
736, 747 (1924) : "M6st frequently the doctrine of public policy is regarded as having merely
a negative function, that of justifying the non-application of a 'foreign' law, which ought
to govern ton principle. Others assign to it also a positive function, according to which
duties may be imposed contrary to those that would result from the application of the
general rule. In this view ... the doctrine of public policy is not merely a convenient
safety-valve to prevent the application of 'foreign' law, but a method whereby old rules are
modified and new rules established. In England and the United States the doctrine of
public policy is generally limited to its negative function, and no attempt has been made
by the Anglo-American writers to reduce the cases falling within this doctrine to any
system or order." Our attempt leads us to the conclusion that Lorenzen's assessment of
the Anglo-American law is erroneous: -public policy does serve what he calls "a positive
function," although the language of the cases seems superbly designed to disguise that fact.
76. Warner v. Florida Bank,& Trust Co., 160 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1947) ; Shannon v.
Irving Trust Co., 275 N.Y. 95, 9 N.E.2d 792 (1937); Cross v. United States Trust Co.,
131 N.Y. 330, 30 N.E. 125 (1892), are instances in which the public policy contention was
rejected.
77. 262 N.Y. 381, 187 N.E. 65 (1933).
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the trust property should control. An interesting use of public policy was
made. Subsequent to the creation of the trust involved, the New York Legisla-
ture had passed a statute providing that when an instrument creating a trust of
personalty located in New York at the time of creation declared that the trust
should be construed and regulated by New York law, New York law should
govern the validity and effect of the trust regardless of where the settlor lived.
The court found this to be a declaration of New York's public policy, extending
to trust instruments in which the intent to be governed by New York law
could be implied as well as those in which such intent was expressed.
There is certainly no objection to New York's courts finding aids to de-
cision in the acts of her legislature. The use of the public policy formulation
when a court is reasoning from a statute that cannot be directly applied to the
case before it is fairly commonJ 8 It would be better if judges eschewed the
protean "public policy" in favor of a simple statement recognizing the im-
portance of legislation as embodying principles from which help may be de-
rived in determining choice of law rules.
78. More typical than the use of a statute that is inapplicable because passed after the
transaction occurred is resort to statutes from which can be derived a general legislative
intention. Thus, in Hinds v. Brazeale, 3 Miss. (2 How.) 837 (1838), the validity of a
deed of emancipation of a slave was in question. The slave's owner, a domiciliary of Mis-
sissippi, had made a special trip to Ohio to execute the deed, apparently aware that the
deed would be no good if executed in Mississippi. The court held the deed invalid, relying
heavily on the fact that Mississippi had a number of statutes directed against free Ndgroes.
"The policy of a state is indicated by the general course of legislation on a given subject,
and we find that free negroes are deemed offensive, because they are not permitted to
emigrate to, or remain in the state." Id. at 842; accord, e.g., Ciampittiello v. Campitello,
134 Conn. 51, 54 A.2d 669 (1947) ; Ulman, Magill & Jordan Woolen Co. v. Magill, 155 Ga.
555, 117 S.E. 657 (1923); Ayub v. Automobile Mortgage Co., 252 S.W. 287 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1923), rev'd, 266 S.W. 134 (Tex. 1924).
The willingness of courts to treat a statute as a source of law extending beyond its
literal meaning is certainly commendable. See Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law,
HAv. LEGAL EssAYs 213 (1934). It must be recognized, however, that the practice has
its dangers. There is the obvious risk of plain misinterpretation, illustrated by Mackey v.
Pettijohn, discussed in text at note 52 stepra. There is the subtler danger, discussed in text
at note 73 supra, to which many courts succumb, of taking a statute that was probably aimed
at local transactions, characterizing it as an embodiment of public policy, and applying it
to a foreign transaction without giving due weight to the transaction's foreign contacts.
Analogous to the use of statutes not directly applicable to the transaction before the
court as a source of public policy is the use of such statutes to demonstrate that the forum's
public policy would not be contravened by granting relief. The best known instance is
Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878), in which it was held that Massachusetts had no
public policy against enforcing the contractual liability of a married woman, even though
at the time the contract was made it would have been unenforceable if made in Massa-
chusetts, because married women had been given full contractual capacity by a statute en-
acted subsequent to the transaction. Accord, Kentucky v. Bassford, 6 Hill 526 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1844) ("Indeed, the policy of raising money by lottery for public purposes, such
as for literary and benevolent institutions, continued to prevail in this state until 1833.
. ,. It would be rather ungracious for our courts, under these circumstances, to refuse
to uphold the contract in question, within the rule of comity, on the ground that it was
founded in moral turpitude." Id. at 530.) ; Case v. Dodge, 18 R.I. 661, 29 Atl. 785 (1894)
("The policy of our law relating to married women having thus been changed, such a con-
tract made elsewhere, though prior in date to the passage of the statute, would no longer
contravene the policy of our law .. ." Id. at 663, 29 Atl. at 786.) ; ef. the use of the sub-
stantial similarity doctrine, discussed in text at note 32 supra, to reach a holding that the
forum's public policy is not infringed.
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Like many of the cases we have already considered in this section, Hutchi-
son v. Ross could undoubtedly have reached the same result without any ref-
erence at all to public policy. The court of appeals frankly treated it as a make-
weight, saying, "We may throw in the balance also expressions of public policy
by the Legislature of this State."79 And, again like many of the cases we have
considered in this Section, our serious quarrel with the case is the unfortunate
use of a phrase which provides no help in ascertaining what was done.
A curious mixture of choice of law thinking and public policy appears in
Matter of Clarkson." In that case a California domiciliary's will set up a trust
providing for an accumulation that was invalid under New York law but valid
under California law. The trustees were appointed by the New York Surro-
gate's Court and were administering the trust in New York by virtue of a Cali-
fornia decree ordering a transfer to those trustees. The court decided that the
accumulation was "contrary to the public policy of this State as enunciated in
its statutes." "However," the court proceeded, "since the deceased at the time
of her death was a resident of the State of California, the second question pre-
sented is whether this court should follow the law of California, the domicil of
the testatrix, or the law of New York State."81
The court had thus been using public policy in a local law sense to deter-
mine whether New York law would uphold the trust if all of its contacts were
in New York. Then it turned to the conflicts problem:
Since the petitioning trustees have been appointed by this court and
are administering the trust within this jurisdiction, by virtue of a de-
cree of the California court ordering a transfer to such trustees,
this court believes the law of this State to be controlling.
This court is not bound by comity to effectuate a foreign law
which would contravene the positive policy of the law of the forum
and when one person sends property into another jurisdiction he sub-
jects it to laws of the foreign forum. . . . Similarly the New York
courts have held that comity does not require them to substitute the
policy and laws of a foreign State in place of its own.8 2
The court thus used public policy in the conflicts sense, but carried its local
law characterization of public policy over to the conflicts problem without giv-
ing it a thought. Apparently, at the time of the testatrix's death the property
subject to the trust was located in California, which was also the testatrix's
domicil, giving the trust significant contacts with California. Nevertheless, the
place of administration of a trust has received recognition as an important con-
79. 262 N.Y. at 394, 187 N.E. at 71.
80. 201 Misc. 943, 107 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Surr. Ct. 1951).
81. Id. at 945, 107 N.Y.S.2d at 292.
82. Id. at 945-46, 107 N.Y.S.2d at 292-93.
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tact,83 -and so application of New York's law can be justified, But it is im-
possible to see how the court's use of public policy aided it in reaching a sound
decision, and it certainly impeded giving due weight to the transaction's close
connections with California.8
4
C. Place of Performance and Place of Tort
In a number of older cases the out-of-state effect of a release from liabil-
ity for negligence on the part of a carrier or telegraph company was before the
courts. Similar cases presented the problem of the validity of contractual lim-
itations on the amount of liability. Frequently the forum refused to use the
supposedly applicable place of making rule by invoking the public policy doc-
trine and applied local law. Sometimes, as in Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. v.
Teeters,s5 the same result could have been reached by classifying the problem
as a tort matter and making use of the place of the tort rule. In that case,
Teeters was injured in a wreck on defendant's railroad in Indiana while he
was accompanying a shipment of livestock from New York State to Chicago.
He had signed a contract which exonerated the carrier from liability for neg-
ligence. The Indiana court chose to analyze the problem in terms of contract law
by stating that a contract was governed by the law of the place of making, subject
to the exception that if the contract violated the public policy of the forum it
would not be enforced. Teeters was permitted to recover in spite of the con-
tract because the limitation on liability violated the public policy of Indiana.
The -court's opinion shows the importance, in its thinking, of the place of the
tort contact:
This state is concerned in the protection of the lives and limbs of
all persons within its borders, whether interstate passengers or other-
wise, and, as respects responsibility for torts committed within the
jurisdiction of its laws, its courts will . . . assume to determine the
common law for themselves and will not permit parties to contravene
83. See Cavers, Trusts Inter Vivos and the Conflict of Laws, 44 HARV. L. Rsv. 161,
165, 190 (1930).
84. The court in Clarkson struck down the accumulation and ordered the trustee to
pay all the income to the beneficiary. Compare the disposition made in Despard v. Church-
ill, 53 N.Y. 192 (1873), where a California domiciliary had made a will in his home state
which violated the New York statute on perpetuities and accumulations. The court found
that statute to embody the New York policy on perpetuities and accumulations. "As this
sovereignty will not uphold a devise or bequest by one of its citizens in contravention of
that policy, it will not give its direct aid to sustain, enforce or administer hero such a devise
or bequest made by a citizen of another sovereignty .... Yet it is no part of the policy
of this State to interdict perpetuities or accumulations in another State." Id. at 198. Con-
sequently, the court ordered the assets to be remitted to the executors in California to be
administered there. It need hardly be pointed out that Despard, like Clarkson, could
have reached the same result without public policy talk. See Cross v. United States
Trust Co., 131 N.Y. 330, 30 N.E. 125 (1892), where, referring to Despard, the court says,
"This course was adopted, not on the ground of policy, but because it was always the law
in such cases to remit personal estate to the domicile of the owner, in the exercise of a
sound judicial discretion." Id. at 347, 30 N.E. at 129.
85. 166 Ind. 335, 77 N.E. 599 (1906).
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the domestic policy 6f the state by invidious contract for -exemptions
from liability for negligence.86
In other cases the courts have pointed to the importance of the forum's
law because the contract was to be performed there. In a famous statement
the United States Supreme Court said:
The contention amounts to this: Where a contract is made in a
foreign country, to be executed at least in part in the United States,
the law of the foreign country either by its own force or in virtue of
the zigreement of the contracting parties, must be enforced by the
courts of the United States, even though to do so requires the viola-
tion of the public policy of the United States. To state the proposition
is, we think, to answer it.
8 7
It would certainly seem that the state in which a contract of shipment (or
of the transmission of a telegram) is to be partially performed has a connection
with the transaction sufficiently important to permit the state's law to control
a term of the agreement respecting the consequences of imperfect performance.
This may be true even if the failure in performance occurs outside the state.
88
The argument would be that it is necessary to deny effect to liability-limiting
contractual provisions in order to prevent a lowering of standards of care.
86. Id. at 342-43, 77 N.E. at 601; see International & Great No. R.R. v. Vandeventer,
107 S.W. 560 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908).
87. The Kensington, 183 U.S. 263, 269 (1902) ; see Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Hill, 163 Ala. 18, 50 So. 248 (1909) ; Atlanta & W.P.R.R. v. Broome, 3 Ga. App. 641, 60
S.E. 355 (1908); Nonotuck Silk Co. v. Adams Express Co., 256 Ill. 66, 99 N.E. 893(1912) ; Williamson v. Postal Tel. Co., 151 N.C. 223, 65 S.E. 974 (1909); Hanson v. Great
No. Ry., 18 N.D. 324, 121 N.W. 78 (1909) ; St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Texas, 36
Tex. Civ. App. 399, 82 S.W. 346 (1904) ; Carstens Packing Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 58
Wash. 239, 108 Pac. 613 (1910). In all these cases the public policy doctrine was used
to strike down a contractual limitation on tort liability valid at the place of contracting.
In each case the forum was the state of at least part of the defendant's performance.
Cf. Faulkner v. Hart, 82 N.Y. 413 (1880), which achieved an application of the
forum's law by an interesting method. In that case goods had been shipped from New
York to Boston, where they were destroyed by fire in the defendant's warehouse. Under
the law merchant, which was the law of New York, the defendant was liable; Massachu-
setts case law was to the contrary. The court seemed willing to assume that Massachusetts
law would normally govern, but relied upon Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19
(1842)' for the proposition that, "[W]hile the decisions of local courts in reference to
matters purely local in the States are obligatory throughout the country, they are not
conclusive and final as to questions of commercial law." 82 N.Y. at 418. "From the au-
thorities cited it follows that if the higher court in the State of Massachusetts has made an
erroneous decision, wrong in principle and contrary to a well-settled rule of commercial
law in the English courts, in the Supreme Court of the United States, and many of the
State courts, and especially adverse to the decisions of this court, it should not be followed
here. . . ." Id. at 419. "Like an unconstitutional law, void of itself, the decision [of the
Massachusetts court] was not the law, and is not to be regarded as authority for that
reason." Id. at 423.
88. See F. A. Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 254 N.Y. 407, 173 N.E. 564 (1930).
In Straus, silk was to be shipped from Shanghai to Vancouver, B.C. by defendant's ship
and thence by defendant's railroad to New York. Three bales of silk were discovered
stolen upon arrival of the shipment in Vancouver. The contract of shipment was gov-
erned by British law under which the limitation of liability for negligence was valid.
The Court of Appeals of New York held the limitation inapplicable in New York because
it violated public policy there.
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Since the carrier is not likely to vary its standards as it passes over state
boundaries, any state in which the contract is to be partially performed can
validly insist that it has the right to strike down such provisions regardless of
where the injury occurs, a requirement of reasonable care over the whole
route being necessary in order to insure that reasonable care is taken within
its own boundaries.89
In these cases the important problem is whether the local law respecting
the illegality of contracts should provide the answer. The question is a ques-
tion of policy but of policy about the conflict of laws. Is it more important
to choose the local law rather than the law of the place of contract because the
injury 'caused by the negligence actually occurred in the forum or the contract
was to be partially performed there? To answer the question requires hard
thinking about the purposes of choice of law rules. Little but the unhappy
ingredient of local pride is added by analyses in terms of public policy.
D. Domicil
In another group of cases public policy language serves to cover a choice
of law based on the importance of the domicil contact in matters of personal
status. For example, when the domicil of parties to a marriage celebrated
elsewhere is the forum and its courts refuse to recognize the validity of the
marriage on public policy grounds, the forum is merely asserting its right as
domicil to have its law control the transaction.90 A marriage valid when made
89. A similar argument can be made with respect to Fox v. Postal Telegraph Cable
Co., discussed in text at note 43 supra. In other words, it might be said that in order for Wis-
consin to be sure that reasonable care is exercised when Wisconsin is the place of sending or
delivery of a telegram, it must strike down limitations on liability even in cases in which the
particular transaction before the Wisconsin court did not involve either receipt or delivery
in Wisconsin. The difficulty with the argument as applied to a case like Fox, in which
even partial performance within the state is lacking, is that it proves too much. It would
entitle a forum to apply its law to a tort, no matter where committed, so long as the de-
fendant was also carrying on activities within the forum state.
90. The rules are described in RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 132 (1934). In
general, domiciliary states have been quite liberal in recognizing marriages celebrated in
other states. E.g., In re Miller's Estate, 239 Mich. 455, 214 N.W. 428 (1927). Compare
Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458 (1873) (remarriage of Massachusetts domiciliary,
who was guilty party to divorce, in New Hampshire, where such marriage was valid,
upheld in Massachusetts, even though Massachusetts law prohibits such remarriage);
Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. *157 (1819) (negro-white marriage of Massachusetts
domiciliaries in Rhode Island, where such marriages are valid, upheld in Massachusetts,
even though Massachusetts law prohibits such marriages) ; Matter of May, 305 N.Y.
486, 114 N.E2d 4 (1953) (marriage of New York uncle and niece in Rhode Island, where
marriage was valid, upheld in New York, even though in New York such a marriage is
incestuous), with Pennegar v. State, 87 Tenn. 244, 10 S.W. 305 (1889) (remarriage of
Tennessee domiciliary, who was guilty party to divorce, in Alabama, where such marriage
was valid, denied recognition in Tennessee); Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (30
Graft.) *858 (1878) (negro-white marriage of Virginia domiciliaries in District of Co-
lumbia, where such marriages are valid, denied recognition in Virginia) ; Brook v. Brook,
9 H.L.C. 193, 11 Eng. Rep. 703 (1861) (marriage of English widower and the sister of his
deceased wife in Denmark, where such marriage was valid, denied recognition in England).
Cf. Dupre v. Executor of Boulard, 10 La. Ann. 411 (1855), in which the court was so out-
raged by the marriage of a negro and a white in France that it refused to give any further
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both at the place of celebration and at the domicil of the parties may possibly
be disregarded on public policy grounds if the parties move to a new domiciliary
state.9 1 The state of the domicil has a proper interest in a continuing relation-
ship within its borders so that domiciliary law may be employed (within con-
stitutional limitations) to determine whether a "marriage" of local people is one
which the domicil can recognize. In a similar way, a contract, valid where made,
may be unenforceable at the domicil if in restraint of marriage. 2
The importance of the domicil contact is illustrated in the very well known
Mertz v. Mertz.9 3 A wife brought an action in New York against her husband
because of injuries sustained in Connecticut. In Connecticut spouses may sue
each other in tort, but they cannot in New York, which was the domicil state
as well as the forum. The wife's suit was dismissed, the opinion first giving the
public policy of New York as a reason for dismissal. Yet there is more to the
essay. The wife is without remedy because, "The law of this State attaches
to the marriage status a reciprocal disability.' In sum, after a public policy
discussion containing, as it does, a famous definition of the term,9 4 the opinion
characterizes the question as a family law matter appropriately referred to the
law of the domicil.9 5
facts. It is consequently impossible to tell whether the parties were domiciliaries of
Louisiana or not.
91. United States ex rel. Devine v. Rodgers, 109 Fed. 886 (E.D. Pa. 1901) ; see lit re
Takahashi's Estate, 113 Mont. 490, 129 P.2d 217 (1942). On the miscegenation problem,
compare State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242 (1877) (upholding marriage), with State v. Bell,
66 Tenn. 9 (1872) (refusing to recognize marriage). As a general matter, of course, the
new domiciliary state of a married couple recognizes the status created under another
state's law. A leading case is Sutton v. Warren, 51 Mass. (10 Met.) 451 (1845). In
Lederkremer v. Lederkremer, 173 Misc. 587, 18 N.Y.S.2d 725 (Sup. Ct. 1940), the New
York court refused, on public policy grounds, to apply the Polish conception of duress in
a proceeding to annul a Polish marriage. The court said:
The institution of marriage in this state is based upon mutual consent and recip-
rocal love and affection. There was no legal consent by plaintiff; no love or af-
fection in fact by defendant. Under the circumstances, New York law and not
Polish law should be applied because the latter (according to defendant) would
give validity to a marriage of two New York residents to which one party has not
consented, thereby contravening violently the Public policy of this state. Id. at 590,
18 N.Y.S.2d at 729.
92. Lobek v. Gross, 2 N.J. 100, 65 A.2d 744 (1949). The contract was an Illinois con-
tract calling for the woman to be a man's close companion and pledging her to abstain from
marriage while her employer lived. The domicil contact ought to be sufficient reason for
a court to use its law to test the validity of a contract in restraint of marriage. The em-
ployer was domiciled in New Jersey; therefore one may be permitted to guess that his
constant companion was also domiciled there.
93. 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936) ; accord, Kyle v. Kyle, 210 Minn. 204, 297 N.W.
744 (1941); Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935); see Annot., 22
A.L.R.2d 1248 (1952).
94. "Therefore, when we speak of the public policy of the state, we mean the law of
the state, whether found in the Constitution, the statutes or judicial records." 271 N.Y.
at 472, 3 N.E.2d at 599.
95. In a recent opinion, Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955), the
California Supreme Court held that thequestion whether a daughter might sue her father
for personal injuries was subject to the law of their domicil, not the place of the tort:
We think that disabilities to sue and immunities from suit because of a family
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There is another cluster of cases in which domicil is a more important
contact than the traditionally stated choice of law rule would allow: the cases
concerning the capacity of married women to contract. In these cases, as in so
many of the others we have already considered, the basic choice of law rule-
the place of contracting governs matters of capacity-was deemed by a number
of courts to be unsatisfactory. But rather than boldly reject the generally ac-
cepted rule, they used the public policy doctrine to undercut it, thereby achiev-
ing the desired effect by a misleading route.
The classical case runs like this: A married woman, domiciled in a state
that limits the capacity of married women, enters into a contract, which by the
law of her domicil she lacks capacity to make, in a state that permits married
women to make such contracts; she defaults, and suit is brought against her
in her home state. Armstrong v. Best 6 is a fairly typical response to the
problem:
[T] he general current of English and American authorities is in favor
of holding that a contract which, by the law of the place, is recognized
as lawfully made by a capable person, is valid everywhere, although
the person would not, under the law of the domicile, be deemed ca-
pable of making it. . . . But quite a different question is presented
when the action is brought in the forum of the domicile. In such a
case a very important qualification of private international law is to be
considered; and this is, that no state or nation will enforce a foreign
law which is contrary to its fixed and settled policy. . .. [T]he en-
forcement of the present contract is wholly repugnant to our domestic
policy. .... 97
A good case can be made in support of the result in Armstrong v. Best.
Professor Cook stoutly defended a reference to the domiciliary law in cases in
which the parties to the contract know or ought to know that the married wom-
an's domicil is outside the .state of making.98  But the refusal to tackle the
relationship are more properly determined by reference to the law of the state of
the family domicile. That state has the primary responsibility for establishing and
regulating the incidents of the family relationship and it is the only state in which
the parties can, by participation in the legislative processes, effect a change in
those incidents. Moreover, it is undesirable that the rights, duties, disabilities, and
immunities conferred or imposed by the family relationship should constantly
change as members of the family cross state boundaries during temporary absences
from their home. Since all of the parties to the present case are apparently domi-
ciliaries of California, we must look to the law of this state to determine whether
any disabilities or immunities exist. Id. at 428, 289 P.2d at 223.
Emery is the subject of a comment by Professor Ehrenzweig, 23 U. Cur. L. REv. 474
(1956).
96. 112 N.C. 59, 17 S.E. 14 (1893).
97. Id. at 62-65, 17 S.E. at 15-16; see Taylor v. Leonard, 275 S.W. 134 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1925); cf. King v. Bruce, 145 Tex. 647, 201 S.W.2d 803 (1947). A leading case
reaching a result contrary to Armstrong v. Best is International Harvester Co. v. McAdam,
142 Wis. 114, 124 N.W. 1042 (1910). The opinion is rich with the citation of authority;.
see also Cloud v. Hug, 281 S.W.2d 911 (Ky. 1955).
1 98. See CooK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws 436-38,
(1942).
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choice of law rule head on is quite unwise. In effect, the domicil is asserting
its significance as a contact only when suit happens to be brought in that state.
Not only is this an invitation to forum shopping, since when suit is brought in
a state other than the domicil a different law will be applied, but it is an un-
necessary subordination of what may, in some -circumstances, be the most sig-
nificant contact for the purpose of determining contractual capacity. In the
leading case of Unidn Trust Co. v. Grossman,"9 the Supreme Court of the
United States recognized the possibility that a forum other than the domicil
might refuse to enforce a contract when the law of the defendant's domicil
denied her capacity to enter the contract sued upon. Even in that case, how-
ever, the emphasis on the fact that the forum was the domicil was quite strong.
There is another defect in the public policy approach to the problem of
choosing the law governing a married woman's capacity to contract. The fail-
ure of the courts which refuse to enforce their domiciliaries' contractual lia-
bility to question the generally stated choice of law rule makes it more probable
that courts that are reluctant to use the parochial-seeming public policy doc-
trine will continue to apply the law of the place of making to determine the
liability of their domiciliaries. A re-examination of the choice of law rule is
thus neglected because of the willingness of some courts to achieve the desired
result by evading that rule. The Kentucky Supreme Court in R. S. Barbee &
Co. v. Bevins, Hopkins & Co.100 quite properly rejected the public policy ar-
gument, saying, "It is true that it is against the public policy of this state . . .
to permit a married woman by a contract made and to be performed here to
bind her property as surety for the debt of another, except by mortgage or
other conveyance, but it does not follow necessarily that it is against the public
policy of this state to enforce such a contract when valid where made. . 1.. 1
The court went on to enforce the contract without ever considering the pos-
sibility that a married woman's domicil may have a genuine claim, because of
its interest in its citizens, to have its law applied when a question of contractual
capacity is under consideration.
It is possible, too, that a barbarity like Ulman, Magill & Jordan Woolen
Co. v. Magill02 might have been avoided if a frank acceptance of the domicil
as a controlling contact had replaced all the public policy talk in the married
woman cases. The question in Magill was:
Will the statute law of Missouri, providing that where. a married
99. 245 U.S. 412 (1918). The Grossmnan case has been followed in several cases among
vhich are: Lloyd v. Cooper Corp., 101 Fla. 533, 134 So. 562 (1931) ; Bramwell v. Con-
quest, 2 S.W.2d 995 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), as well as cases discussed in the text.
100. 176. Ky. 113, 195 S.W. 154 (1917).
101. Id. at 114-15, 195 S.W. at 155 (text in unofficial -reporter slightly different).
102. 155 Ga. 555, 117 S.E. 657 (1923) ; see Sally v. Bank of Union, 150 Ga. 281, 103
S.E. 460 (1920), discussed in.note 21 supra. Contra, Robinson v. Queen, 87 Tenn. 445(1889). .
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woman signs a promissory note as surety for her husband she is liable
for the amount of the note, be enforced in this State, in a case where
a married woman living in Missouri signs in Missouri a promissory
note as surety for her husband, the contract to be performed in Mis-
souri, and while she is still domiciled in Missouri she is sued by at-
tachment in Georgia . . . ?103
The Supreme Court of Georgia refused to enforce the defendant's liability be-
cause, "[T]here is no matter of public policy more firmly fixed in this state
than that which outlaws a contract of suretyship on the part of a wife in behalf
of her husband. ... 104 It is readily apparent that the Magill case is very
different from those previously considered in this subsection: Georgia's only
claim to have its law applied is the fact that the attached property was located
there. Considering the nature of the transaction, it is clear that this is a con-
tact of little importance.
As we have seen, "public policy" may be the instrument by which the
state of the situs applies its own law in a property case or by which the state
of the domicil does so in appropriate cases. In Herzog v. Stern,'"0 a Virginia
fact situation giving rise to a personal injury claim against a deceased tort-
feasor's estate, New York was both the domicil of the decedent and the situs
of his property. With two such important contacts it is not surprising to find
the Court of Appeals of New York saying that the Virginia survival statute
contravened the public policy of New York. The court clearly saw the prob-
lem as a descent and distribution question properly subject to New York law.100
E. Place of Trial
There is undoubtedly a connection between the public policy exception
and the procedure-substance distinction employed in conflict of laws cases. A
decision that a particular problem is procedural, like many decisions that for-
eign law violates the forum's public policy, results in an application of forum
law. Furthermore, some of the cases which refuse to apply out-of-state law on
public policy grounds can properly be seen as an attempt by the forum to pro-
tect the integrity of its own processes of decision. A private agreement as to
the admissibility of evidence or the mode of procedure will not be given effect
contrary to the forum's law regardless of the validity of the contract abroad.107
103. 155 Ga. at 555-56, 117 S.E. at 657 (text in unofficial reporter slightly different).
104. Ibid.
105. 264 N.Y. 379, 191 N.E. 23 (1934).
106. "A rule that would permit the depletion of the estate of a deceased resident
through enforcement of claims for damages for personal injuries sustained outside of the
State, where the Legislature has denied such remedy for injuries within the State, seems
to me unreasonable. . ." Id. at 384, 191 N.E. at 25 (text in unofficial reporter slightly
different). Wallan v. Rankin, 173 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1949), and Kertson v. Johnson, 185
Minn. 591, 242 N.W. 329 (1932), reach results contrary to Herzog V. Stern.
107. See 6 CoRarN, CoNTRAcTs § 1432 n.76 (1951). In addition to the cases discussed
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By the common law of some states local agreements to arbitrate are
against public policy as a matter of internal law. A court in such a state will
ignore contractual provisions calling for arbitration, will proceed to decide any
controversy arising between the parties, and, of course, will not affirmatively
enforce the arbitration clause. Some of these courts have refused to give effect
to arbitration agreements even where the contract has been made and is to be
performed abroad. The result can be achieved by saying that the arbitration
clause violates the "public policy" of the forum or by asserting that such con-
tracts relate to the remedy or the jurisdiction of courts and that these matters
are determined by the law of the forum.108
Under the law of some states a liability insurance company can be joined
with the tortfeasor or the insurance company can be sued directly without the
insured. In Louisiana the company can be sued directly even if the contract
was made abroad between non-citizens, provided the tort occurred in Louisi-
ana.109 These results are reached by statutes rendering invalid contractual pro-
visions which do not impose liability on the company until the responsibility
of the insured has been fixed by judgment or until judgment has been satisfied.
In Lieberthal v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 0 the Michigan Supreme
Court refused to entertain a suit against the insurance company of a Wisconsin
tortfeasor. The suit would have been permitted in Wisconsin, the place of
plaintiff's personal injury. There was no doubt that the contract of insurance
was subject to Wisconsin law. The majority of the court felt bound by a
Michigan statute which provided:
in the text, Mount Ida School for Girls, Inc. v. Rood, 253 Mich. 482, 235 N.W. 227 (1931),
is an example of the place of trial contact overriding the usual conflicts rule. The forum's
rule on proof of damages was used, in part, on the ground that the Massachusetts rule
violated Michigan public policy. The Restatement recognizes the use of public policy in
the sense discussed herein: "A distinction is to be noted between such a policy and the
policy which, while it does not require denial of access to the courts of the forum, neverthe-
less requires the courts to apply certain local rules in the course of the litigation to enforce
the local notions concerning the manner and method in which the courts of that state should
function. This latter policy may be called the procedural policy of the forum." RESTATE-
MENT, CoNFLICT oF LAws § 612, comment a (1934).
108. See Meachan v. Jamestown, F. & C.R.R., 211 N.Y. 346, 105 N.E. 653 (1914).
Notwithstanding the decisions of the courts of Pennsylvania that the contract
as to arbitration was valid and enforceable in that state, judicial comity does not
require us to hold that such provision of a contract which is contrary to a declared
policy of our courts . . .shall be enforced as between non-residents of our juris-
diction in cases where the contract is executed and to be performed without this
state, and denied enforcement when made and performed within our state. Id. at
351, 352, 105 N.E. at 655.
Cf. Miller v. American Ins. Co., 124 F. Supp. 160 (W.D. Ark. 1954) ; see Lorenzen, Com-
inercial Arbitration--International and Interstate Aspects, 43 YALE L.J. 716, 728-51 (1934) ;
Philips, Arbitration and Conflicts of Laws: A Study of Benevolent Compulsion, 19 CORNELL
L.Q. 197 (1934) ; Note, Commercial Arbitration and the Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLUM. L.
REv. 902 (1956).
109. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (1951). The statute was held constitutional against
an attack on due process grounds in Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S.
66 (1955).
110. 316 Mich. 37, 24 N.W.2d 547 (1946) ; cf. Kertson v. Johnson, 185 Minn. 591, 242
N.W. 329 (1932).
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In such original action (including personal injuries caused by a motor
vehicle), such insurance company (authorized to do business in
Michigan), or other insurer, shall not be made, or joined as a party
defendant, nor shall any reference whatever be made to such an in-
surance company, or other insurer, or to the question of carrying of
such insurance during the course of trial.'
Justice North of the Michigan Supreme Court explained the purpose of the
statute:
The public policy sought to be sustained in this State by the stat-
ute and judicial decisions is that a plaintiff shall not be permitted to
inject into his suit the element of insurance and thereby obtain an ex-
cessive and unjust verdict.112
The dissenting judges interpreted the statute as applying only to actions based
on insurance policies issued in Michigan.
Here, indeed, are some troublesome issues. Does the fact of insurance, if
revealed to the jury, make it so difficult for a Michigan tribunal to arrive at a
fair verdict that plaintiffs must be denied a direct action against insurers
which would be available in the state in which the tort occurred? Has the
legislature foreclosed judicial inquiry into what the proper rule should be?
The solution of these problems is not advanced by argument about whether
the law of Wisconsin is so different from the law of Michigan as to amount to
a difference of "public policy." Yet both majority and dissent debate whether
the "public policy" exception should rule out the use of the place of the tort
rule. The real questions, what did the legislature intend and what does the
operation of our court system require, do not receive the direct and careful
attention they deserve.
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York recently de-
cided a case under the Louisiana direct action statute."13 Plaintiff, a resident
of Brooklyn, was injured in Louisiana and brought suit against a Maryland
insurance company qualified to do business in New York and Louisiana. The
policy had been issued in the State of Louisiana for Louisiana State University.
The court refused to entertain the action on the ground that New York's
public policy was violated in not one, but two, ways. First, to give relief would
be inconsistent with cases emphasizing "the great importance . .. of keeping
from a jury any inkling that the defendant is insured." 1 4 just how great that
111. Mica. ComP. LAws § 522.33 (1948).
112. 316 Mich. at 41-42, 24 N.W.2d at 549.
113. Morton v. Maryland Cas. Co., 1 App. Div. 2d 116, 148 N.Y.S.2d 524 (2d Dep't
1955).
114. Id. at 124, 148 N.Y.S.2d at 531. If the primary factor establishing New York's
public policy is the keeping of information concerning the existence of insurance from thejury, the opinion of the appellate division should have a short life. After January 1, 1957,
an automobile may not be registered in New York without evidence of liability insurance
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importance really is, is demonstrated only by quotations from New York
opinions repeating the rule that evidence of the fact of insurance is ordinarily
inadmissible and by noting that the New York direct action statute which per-
mits the injured party to sue the insurance company if the judgment remains
unsatisfied for thirty days has been strictly construed. Second, the Louisiana
statute is "diametrically opposed to our'law" and, therefore, a direct action
against the company can be maintained only when the conditions of a New
York statute are met. The court is particularly hostile to the Louisiana statute
as it has been interpreted in Louisiana because "none of the defenses estab-
lished by the contract of insurance which the casualty company might have
against the insured are available . . .,"15 (such as the failure to give prompt
notice or failure t; cooperate in the defefise of the action). Insofar as the sec-
ond factor moved the court, this decision belongs in that rare categoiy of cases
which refuse to grant recovery on the ground of "repugnancy" to the forum's
law even when the forum has no close contact with the case. It is interesting
to note that in a similar case, apparently decided without knowledge of the
appellate division's opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit decided that the Louisiana statute did not violate New York's public
policy."
6
Decisions have sometimes spoken in terms of public policy when the
forum was clearly not a fair place in which to try a case. For example, in
Southern Surety Co. v. Illinois Powder Mfg. Co.,117 the powder company sued
the surety of a Mississippi contractor to recover payment for goods supplied.
The bond between the surety and the contractor provided only for indemnity
to a Mississippi Drainage District in the event of default by the contractor.
However, a Mississippi statute which required that the bond secure payment
to suppliers was made a part of the contract by Mississippi law. Under the
statute the company was required to answer only in a single action brought
after publication of notice in the county or town where the contract was per-
formed. The Texas court refused to entertain the suit on the ground of "public
policy." The policy was found in considerations of fairness to possible Missis-
sippi claimants under the bond and to the surety company. Mississippians
should not be forced into Texas courts nor should the-company be subject to
more than one action. "[T] he attempted enforcement of the statute by a for-
eign jurisdiction will subject the citizens of the state of its creation to serious
or of qualification as a self insurer. Every juror will, thus, have reason to believe that
any defendant has something in his pocket. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, c. 655, § 93-6.
115. Id. at 126, 148 N.Y.S.2d at 533
116. Collins v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 230 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1956).
117. 31 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). -Accord, United States Gypsum Co. v.
American Surety Co., 14 Tenn. App. 367 (1931).
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injustice or inconvenience.""" In this sense the public policy doctrine is a
form of forum non conveniens.
The very fact that a state is the place of trial gives it a special reason to
apply its own law in cases arising under the so-called "Anti-Heart Balm" acts,
-Some states have abolished actions for breach of promise, alienation of affec-
tions, seduction, and criminal conversation. The actions were abolished
largely because they were supposedly misused as a basis for conduct tantamount
to blackmail. Not only are the actions themselves abolished, but lawyers are
forbidden by criminal sanctions to file claims of that sort. In the face of such
local prohibition, at least two courts have tefused to hear claims arising in
states in which the actions still exist.119 Although the cases speak of the great
difference between local law and foreign law and say that4lvrefore the public
policy of the forum forbids entertaining the action, the argument about the
extent and seriousness of the difference between the law of two states is hardly
necessary. The plain fact is that if a state's court system is being used as part
of an extortion scheme, its legislature has the power to stop it. Since the pos-
sibility of such misuse of the courts does not depend'on where the cause of
action arises, but on where suit is brought, th forum can justifiably ignore
the law of the place of the tort and insist upon the application of its own law.120
California law provides an interesting problem concerning the protection
which ought'to be given the local remedial system and the extent to which the
California courts should properly guard against the misuse of legal process. A
California statute provides that in a libel action against a newspaper or in a
slander action against a radio station the plaintiff shall recover no more than
special (actual) damages unless he files notice of the statement and a demand
for correction upon the publisher within twenty days after he has knowledge of
the publication. A 1954 case arising'ii a California federal district court held
that the California Supreme Court had determined that the enactment de-
clared the public fbolidy of the state.12' The supreme court had said, "It is for
the Legislature, however, to choose between conflicting policies .... u122 This
118. 31 S.W.2d at 317.
119. Fahy v. Lloyd, 57 F. Supp. 156 (D. Mass. 1944) ; Thome v. Macken, 58 Cal. App.
2d 76, 136 P.2d 116 (1943).
120. Perhaps a state's use of public policy to guard against oppression through the use
of its legal system is the real basis of Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Morris, 25 Tenn. App. 272,
156 S.W.2d 350 (1941). Morris, a domiciliary of Georgia, there executed a note con-
taining a waiver of all rights to exemptions. The provision was valid in Georgia. Later
Morris became a domiciliary of Tennessee, in which state action was brought against him
and judgment recovered. The waiver was not enforced against him on the ground that a
waiver of exemption violates Tennessee public policy.
121. Anderson v. Hearst Publishing Co., 120 F. Supp. 850 (S.D. Cal. 1954). Andersonl
is the subject of a perceptive piece of student work, Comment, Public Policy and the Con-flict of Laws, 7 STAN. L. Rxv. 275 (1955).
122. Werner v. Southern California Associated Newspapers, 35 Cal. 2d 121, 129, 216
P.2d 825, 830 (1950).
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language was not directed to a conflict of laws situation but rather to the ques-
tion whether the statute, in local application, was constitutional.
At least three reasons for enacting such legislation can.be given. The legis-
lature could have decided that fairness in respect to damages in libel actions
cannot be achieved within the remedial system of California unless the right to
recover is limited to pecuniary harm. Perhaps the legislators were anxious to
limit the actions because of the serious possibility of- extortion. The law makers
may have been moved to encourage the greatest possible freedom of expression
in public discussion by removing some of the deterrence of the law of libel. The
first two reasons could properly lead the California courts in conflicts cases to
characterize the statute as establishing requirements to protect the adjectival
system of the state. In respect to the third reason the State of California has no
proper concern with publications taking place wholly'outside talifornia. In any
event, the aim of the legislature in respect to an out-of-state case is not revealed
by reference to an opinion which is concerned with the question whether the
statute has a reasonable basis for purposes of constitutional law. Nor is light
thrown on the question by asking abbut the state's public policy. To solve the
problem the courts should meet the question directly and decide whether the
dangers of miscarriage of justice before a local court are sufficient to bar a
plaintiff from asserting a claim which he could make in another state.
IV. THE IMPAcT OF PuBLic LAW
The great conflicts scholar, Dr. Ernst Rabel, in discussing public policy in
the area of contracts conflicts law, points up a distinction which gives us an
insight into a number of American cases. He separates public law, which is
'i aracterized by interference with private law for purposes of the welfare of
the state and of the population generally, from private law itself, which is de-
signed to serve the interests of individuals or organizations rather than the
government.1 23 Dr. Rabel recognizes that this is an imperfect formulation, since,
obviously, individudls benefit when the population benefits generally and, of
course, the state flourishes only to the extent that its citizens do. Basically, what
is meant by public law is legislation of a regulatory nature. The Sherman Act,
minimum wage legislation, and the eighteenth amendment would all be examples
of public law. Dr. Rabel then goes on to say that:
[T]he rules of private international law are limited to a part of the en-
tire legal system. They have no power over the rules of domestic pub-
123. See 2 RABFL, THE CONFLICT oF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, 558-60 (1947):
If a state, not contented with the broad inroads of modern public law into the
former spheres of private law, considers every substantive rule as mingled with
considerations of community interests, it is logical to deny the existence of private
law as the National-Socialist writers have done; they detested even the name of
"Civil Code." Id. at 560.
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lic law, -including all rules serving the interests of the state itself and
the general welfare. These rules are, or should be, accompanied by,
their own territorial delimitations. In their domain, they enjoy at the
forum unconditional precedence over private international law ...
But the boundaries should and may very well be chosen, quite as for
our ordinary conflicts rules, so as to include in principle only the con-
tracts centered within the forum.1
2 4
In effect, Dr. Rabel is pleading for explicit recognition of the impact of
.public law on the choice of law rules usually considered applicable to contracts.
He offers this idea in place of the public policy, exception.1 25 The principal
question, then, is not how to define public policy--but how to delimit the reach
of the forum's public law.1 26
Although no mention of public policy is made in the Court's opinion, Both-
'well v. Buckbee Mears Co.12 T is a leading case which Dr. Rabel might have
used to illustrate his point. The plaintiff sued in Minnesota to recover an
assessment on a Maryland insurance policy which, had been solicited in Minne-
sota and which contemplated some acts of performance in tbat 'state. The in-
surance company was not licensed to do business in Minnesota, and therefore
the solicitation and performance were illegal under Minnesota law. In view of
these facts, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed Minnesota's re-
fusal to permit recovery: "Under rules of law generally applicable a State may
refuse to enforce a contract which provides for doing within it an act pro-
hibited by its laws.' 28
A defense for the outcomes of other business regulation cases that do speak
of public policy can be found in the propriety of protecting a local scheme of
business regulation. The Louisiana appellate court refused to permit recoverjr
of a brokerage fee on a contract made in Mississippi for the service of selling
Mississippi- real estate adjoining Louisiana.129 Although unlicensed, plaintiff
124. Id. at 582. Dr. Rabel's proposition has much in common with the suggestion that
the public policy doctrine should be limited to policy declarations by the legislature. See
Nutting, Suggested Limitations of the Public Policy Doctrine, 19 MINN. L. REv. 196 (1935).
125. See 2 RABEt, op. cit. supra note 123, at 584.
126. "[A]dministrative and fiscal rules have their own scope to be delimited for each
according to its specific purpose." Id. at 560.
127. 275 U.S. 274 (1927).
128. Id. at 278. Commonwealth Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hayden, 60 Neb. 636, 83 N.W. 922(1900), is similar to Bothwell:
[T]he principle of judicial comity does not require our courts to actively aid in the
enforcement of contracts which interfere with, and tend to frustrate, the policy
established by the legislature. Id. at 638, 83 N.W. at 923.
See Seamans v. Temple Co., 105 Mich. 400, 63 N.W. 408 (1845):[Tihe contract was made in Wisconsin and ...is as much in contravention of
the policy of this state as though it had been made . . . here, It cannot be sup-
posed that the statutes cited were intended merely to prevent the act of making the
contract in this state. The object is to protect the citizens of this state against
irresponsible companies, and to prevent insurance by unauthorized companies upon
property in this state. Id. at 404, 63 N.W. at 410.
Isaac Fass, Inc. v. Pink, 178 Va. 357, 17 S.E.2d 379 (1941), should also be consulted.
129. Moore v. Burdine, 174 So. 279 (La. App. 1937).
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conducted his business in New Orleans. Further- it was "a matter of common
knowledge that New Orleans affords the principal market for the disposal of
Mississippi Gulf Coast properties."' 130 Therefore, it was clear that the parties
expected the broker to perform his contract in Louisiana. With such an im-
portant set of connecting factors relating to its public law it is little wonder that
the Louisiana court felt free to apply its law to judge whether the plaintiff could
use its courts.
A weaker example is Reed v- Kelly,'3 ' in which a Chicago- real estate
broker sued in Wisconsin to recover commissions under an Illinois listing
agreement for the sale of.a hotel in Superior, Wisconsin, for a Wisconsin seller.
The Wisconsin statutes provided that real estate brokers had to be licensed
and, further, that no action for commissions could be brought by a broker unless
he alleged and proved that he was licensed. The broker failed because he was
not licensed in Wisconsin, and enforcement of the contract would hence violate
Wisconsin's public policy. The case supports Rabel's distinction when it points
out (by quoting a dictum taken from a non-conflicts case), "The mischief at
which the legislation . . .was aimed was the advantage that persons engaged
in that business were taking of members of the public.'
' 32
So also, it would appear that the question whether an Indiana employee
may recover, in an Indiana action, wage "d uctions paid to a relief °benefit
association illegal under Indiana law is a public law question.'3 3 Recovery was
130. Id. at 281.
131. 81 F. Supp. 755 (W.D. Wis. 1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1949) ; cf. Copell-
'man v. Rabinowitz, 208 Misc. 274, 143 N.Y.S.2d 496 (1955).
132. 81 F. Supp. at 758. Cf. Henning v. Hill, 80 Ind. App. 363, 141 N.E. 66 (1923), in
which public policy was held to be no bar to the enforcement in the Indiana courts of an oral
brokerage contract made in Illinois by Illinois residents concerning Illinois land even though
an Indiana statute requires such contracts to be in writing in order to be valid. The defendant
had become a resident of Indiana after the sale of the land, but Indiana obviously had no
reason to apply her regulatory legislation since she had no contacts with the transaction
either at the time it was entered into or when it was executed.
In FDIC v. Stensland, 70 S.D. 103, 15 N.W.2d 8 (1944), suit was brought in South
Dakota to enforce 'personal liability on a North Dakota purchase money note given in a
transaction involving South Dakota land. The notes were in violation of a South Dakota
statute, and the court held that the claim violated South Dakota public policy. The opinion
clearly indicates the court's conviction that South Dakota public law was involved:
We notice the fact that the law was passed at a time when actions based upon
purchase money notes, deficiency judgments and the like, were causing many
citizens of this state great hardship and the drastic effect of such actions on our
overall economy was apparent .... [T]his legislation declared the enforcement of
the type of contracts therein described to be against the public interest. Id. at 107,
15 N.W.2d at 10.
The Strathearn, 256 Fed. 631 (5th Cir. 1919), is an example of federal public law overriding
the provisions of a British contract. In an appropriate case, of course, "public policy" may be
a federal rather than a state concept. For example, a foreign contract calling for
payment in gold may not be enforced in a state court because contrary to federal monetary
policy. Compania de Inversiones Internacionales v. Industrial Mortgage Bank, 269 N.Y.
22, 198 N.E. 617 (1935). A state may not have a public policy which is inconsistent with
constitutionally valid federal legislation. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
133. Vandalia R.R. v. Kelly, 187 Ind. 323, 119 N.E. 257 (1918).
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permitted in Indiana even though technically the contract was made in Ohio.
The contract, which would not permit recoupment of money paid to the associa-
tion, was said to be against Indiana's public policy.
Some states have refused to enforce foreign contracts restricting competi-
tion on the ground that the forum's public policy in respect to trade regulation
has been violated by such agreements.134 The decisions have involved local
businesses or territorial restrictions embracing the forum. These cases clearly
involve the choice of the forum's internal regulatory law as the test of the
validity of the contract. The significance as a contact of the place in which
competition is restricted is illustrated by the action of a Texas court, when faced
with a Louisiana contract forbidding competition by an ex-employee. The
decree quite properly enjoined the competition in Texas where the contract was
valid but refused to enjoin defendant's Louisiana activity because there such
agreements are illegal.135
New Jersey'3 6 and Nebraska 37 have denied recovery on a small loan
usurious by forum law when the application for the loan was made in the forum.
Some dry states have refused to enforce money claims arising out of the sale of
liquor if both parties were aware that the transaction was aimed at subverting
the local prohibition laws.138
134. Davis v. Jointless Fire Brick Co., 300 Fed. 1 (9th Cir. 1924) ; May v. Mulligan, 36
F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Mich. 1939), aff'd, 117 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1940) ; Standard Fashion Co.
v. Grant, 165 N.C. 453, 81 S.E. 606 (1914) ; Byrd v. Crazy Water Co., 140 S.W.2d 334 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1940) ; cf. J. R. Watkins Co. v. McMullan, 6 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
Sunbeam Corp. v. Masters of Miami, 225 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1955), held that, because fair
trade laws are unconstitutional in Florida, a cause of action against a Florida business
concern, on a theory of its interference with fair trade contracts entered into out of state,
would be against Florida public policy.
135. Grace v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 255 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
136. Continental Adjustment Co. v. Klanse, 174 Atl. 246 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1934). But see
Personal Finance Co. v. Gibson, 26 Ala. App. 18, 152 So. 462 (1933).
137. Personal Finance Co. v. Gilinsky Fruit Co., 127 Neb. 450, 255 N.W. 558 (1934).
Section 18 of the UNIFoRM SMALL LOAN AcT contains a curious return to the similarity
doctrine, providing that, "No loan of the amount . . . of $300 or less for which a greater
rate of interest . . . than is permitted by this Act has been charged . . ., wherever made,
shall be enforced in this State . . . provided that the foregoing shall not apply to loans
legally made in any state which then has in effect a regulatory small loan law similar in
principle to this Act." Nebraska is among the states which have adopted the act; it was
applied in Kinney Loan & Finance Co. v. Sumner, 159 Neb. 57, 65 N.W.2d 240 (1954).
Where the interest is attacked as usurious in cases that do not involve small loans, the
public policy defense generally makes no headway. A rule of alternative reference is
usually applied: if the interest rate is permissible under either the law of the place of making
or the law of the place of performance, it will be upheld. See GooDRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws
334 (3d ed. 1949) ; STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWs 237 (2d ed. 1951). The contrast between
small loan cases and other kinds of borrowing cases can be seen by comparing Mirgon v.
Sherk, 196 Wash. 690, 84 P.2d 362 (1938), with Bank v. Doherty, 42 Wash. 317, 84 Pac. 872
(1906).
138. Feineman v. Sachs, 33 Kan. 621, 7 Pac. 222 (1885) ; Corbin v. Houlehan, 100
Me. 246, 61 Atl. 131 (1905) ; other cases are collected in Annot., 166 A.L.R. 1353 (1947) ;
Annot., 49 A.L.R. 1002 (1927) ; cf. Klein v. Keller, 42 Okla. 592, 141 Pac. 1117 (1914),
in which an Ohio contract for the sale of liquor to a Texas buyer was enforced in pro-
hibitionist Oklahoma. In Theoktistou v. Panama R.R., 6 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1925), the
court properly rejected defendant's contention that to hold it liable for injury done to
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One of the most famous public policy cases, Ciampittiello v. Campitello,139
in spite of language in the opinion which speaks of "ancient and deep-rooted
public policy," is a fine illustration of the impact of public law upon the conflict
of laws. Two brothers had gone from Connecticut to Rhode Island and there
agreed to set up a pool of $300 for purposes of betting at the pari-mutuel ma-
chines at the Pascoag, Rhode Island, track. While on the way home, one brother,
the stake-holder, was killed in an accident. The Connecticut courts refused to
allow the survivor to recover his share of the winnings from his brother's ad-
ministrator on the ground that the gambling contract violated Connecticut
policy. Betting on horse races is a criminal offense in Connecticut, and contracts
to do so are void. These rules are clearly police regulations of the state designed
to advance the public and governmental interests in the morality of the citizenry.
This policy of the public law is fairly implemented by refusing to restore the
fruits of gambling derived from an out-of-state wagering agreement between
domiciliaries .14
0
There is little doubt, then, that Dr. Rabel was on sound ground when he
noted a departure from traditional choice of law rules on public policy grounds
in contracts cases having a public law element. But, as our earlier discussion
illustrates, he was probably amiss in limiting his thesis to public law cases. In
other words, this departure from traditional choice of law rules occurs in what
Dr. Rabel would consider the private law area too.141 Recognition of this fact
plaintiff's saloon in Panama, where the sale of liquor was legal, would violate the public
policy established by American constitutional and statutory prohibition provisions.
139. 134 Conn. 51,54 A.2d 669 (1947).
140. Gambling cases in the conflicts law are collected in Annot., 173 A.L.R. 695(1948) ; Annot., 64 L.R.A. 160 (1904). The gambling case that probably substantiates
Rabel's point most strongly is Savings Bank v. National Bank of Commerce, 38 Fed. 800(W.D. Mo. 1889), where, in effect, the court refused to recognize as a legal obligation a
gambling debt owing from a resident of the forum to a resident of Kansas, even though
the gambling took place in Kansas, where the court assumes, arguendo, that the debt
would be enforceable. Forum law declared the kind of gambling involved to be a crime
and all bills and notes given for a gambling debt void. The court says, id. at 804,
Maltby established his gambling house just across the state line in Kansas
City, Kan., with but a street or block separating it from Kansas City, Mo.; so
close that the immoral atmosphere of his establishment can be breathed by the
people of Missouri, and its demoralizing influence be felt in the adjacent community.
It does seem to me that the courts of justice in this jurisdiction ought to close their
doors against such a suitor when he brings his transactions, growing out of his
nefarious calling, to her temples for arbitrament.
Windt v. Lindy, 169 Tenn. 210, 84 S.W.2d 99 (1935), involved a suit on a note given in
consideration of an agreement not to prosecute a felony. The notes were executed in Penn-
sylvania but here also the forum had a strong interest and Dr. Rabel's analysis is relevant.
The felony (if any) had arisen from obtaining money by false pretenses in Florida.
141. This means, of course, that the significance of the imprecision of Rabel's public
law concept is minimized. While he seems to include only legislative regulation in the
public law concept, it is probable that the idea can be used with respect to judge made
law. For example, in Dial v. Fisk, 197 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946), it was held that
a divorced wife of an insured would not be permitted to recover the proceeds of the in-
surance policy in which she had been named as beneficiary. The policy had been issued by
a Massachusetts company to the insured when he and the plaintiff were still married and
living in Oklahoma. The insured later resided in Texas, where he died without changing
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is implicit in the conviction held by Professor Ehrenzweig and others "that a
'Restatement' of conflict of laws should remain limited to a painstaking analysis
of the law governing narrow fact situations and avoid broad formulas.' 42
V. JUSTICE IN THE INDIVIDUAL CASE
The defense of public policy in a conflicts case may be raised because the
provisions of'the foreign law are pernicious or sharply different from those of
the forum. The public policy principle may be, in reality, a choice of law rule
which makes reference to the forum law because of the importance of the action's
contacts with the state in which-proceedings are brought or because of the impact
of public law on private contracts. Perhaps we can add one more to the list of
the uses of public policy. The principle may be invoked because of injustice in
a particular case. Long ago Professor Cavers argued that fairness of result
in an individual case is a factor too often overlooked in the conflicts area.1 48
Professor Rabel puts the point this way, "[A] court holding that in no case
should a debtor be forced to utter ruin by the enforcement of a contract, may
admit such defense, thus far unknown to American law, against an American
contract."
44
"Public policy" thus could serve as a kind of residual equity principle to
relieve against the harshness of a general rule as it applies to a specific situation
involving important foreign facts. Our research has uncovered no cases which
employ public policy in precisely that way. Two cases come close to the idea.
In both, a plaintiff attempts to impose a liability which comes as a great surprise
to the defendant.
In Farmers' & Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Anderson,14  the defendant, an
Iowan, invested in a Texas business trust under the terms of which the investors
were not to be personally liable for any of the business debts. After defendant
the beneficiary. Both Oklahoma and Massachusetts permit a divorced wife to collect theproceeds of her ex-husband's insurance if she is named as beneficiary in the policy. The
Texas common law rule is that divorce terminates the insurable interest which each
spouse has in the life of the other. The court notes that the insurance policy must have
been renewed in Texas, but declines to decide the case on the question of where the con-
tract was made or the policy issued, basing its decision instead on the ground that it is
contrary to Texas public policy to permit a person to be the beneficiary of a life insurance
policy when such person has no insurable interest in the life of the insured: The insurable
interest requirement must be based either on the justification that it tends to prevent the
murder of the insured or on the theory that otherwise an insurance contract is merely a
gambling arrangement. In either event the insurable interest requirement would seem to
be fulfilling a public law function, and the public law of the forum would have a claim
to govern when the insured becomes a resident of the forum. Cf. Haase v. First National
Bank, 203 Ala. 624, 84 So. 761 (1919), in which the public policy argument was rejected.
142. Ehrenzweig, Parental Immunity in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason Versus
the Restatement, 23-U. Cm. L. REv. 474 n.* (1955).
143. See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem, 47 HAiav. L. REV. 173
(1933).
144. 2 Rabel, op. cit. supra note 123, at 583.
145. 216 Iowa 988,250 N.W. 214 (1933).
1008 [Vol. 66
"PUBLIC POLICY" IN CONFLICTS
had invested in the enterprise and after plaintiff had become a creditor, the courts
of Texas held that the investors, in spite of the terms of the trust, were liable
as partners. The Iowa Supreme Court decided in favor of the defendant in a
suit on a note of the trust asking $48,786.62 plus interest, attorney's fees, and
costs. The amount of defendant's investment does not appear, although it
could have been quite small because the trust was capitalized at $1,000,000
with 100,000 shares at a par value of ten dollars each. The court rested its
decision, in part, on the ground that it would be unfair in the case at hand to
grant recovery:
The doctrine to which we adhere is founded upon principles of justice
and fair dealing. Where a man has contributed his money to and taken
the risk of losing it in an enterprise, with the distinct understanding
and agreement that he shall not be liable for any greater amount than
the money thus contributed, we are unable to see the justice or reason-
ableness of a doctrine which says that he must nevertheless be held
liable to one who has dealt with such enterprise, with full knowledge
of the terms of the agreement .... 141
Although much of the opinion is drafted in rather conventional public policy
'terms the result may be justifiable because of the special equitable factors in the
defendant's favor: (a) the change in the Texas law after defendant's invest-
ments, (b) the knowledge of the plaintiff concerning the original nature of the
enterprise, and (c) the large potential liability on what may have been a rather
small investment.
In Citizens Bank v. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co.,-47 an assessment under
a Georgia statute on shares in a Georgia bank was refused enforcement in
Louisiana. The defendant's mother had purchased the shares in 1911 and they
had passed to the defendant after her death. The statute under which the
assessment was made was passed in 1919. The Louisiana court held that the
liability was not "contracted" because "to say that subsequent statutory en-
actments form a part of the contract [of purchase] . .. is inconsistent with
the primary requisite of conventional obligations, consent of the parties.1 48
The obligation was "statutory" and the statute violated Louisiana public policy.
Again, the defendant can make a claim to our sympathy because of the attempt
to hold him liable on inherited stock not subject to assessment on the date of
purchase.
146. Id. at 996, 250 N.W. at 218. Maxey v. Railey & Bros. Banking Co., 57 S.W2d
1091 (Mo. App. 1933), is a striking case in which the public policy defense protected a
defendant from an outrageous transaction. The defendant gave a note after being cheated
at cards, given an overdose of spirits, and kept imprisoned in a hotel room for several
days. It is very probable that he had defenses, as well, under the Kansas law, the place
of making of the obligation, but the Kansas law was not proved. Cf. Gardner v. Lewis,
7 Gill 377 (Md. 1848).
147. 19 La. App. 461, 140 So. 705 (1932).




The recognition of public policy as a tool for doing substantial justice in
particular cases is a dangerous matter. Applied without the strictest limitations
it could undermine the usual conflicts rules by causing refusals to grant recovery
against a local defendant every time he makes an improvident bargain. But it
need not be so. The business of the courts is to do justice, and, as a general
matter, proceeding according to rule will give the best results, Most courts will
approve and follow the sentiments of Pennsylvania's In re McCerdy'sEstate:140
When our people went to Florida to buy land and there made their
agreements, they submitted themselves to the control of that state's
laws. In returning to this State, they cannot escape responsibility when
sued by taking advantage of our law which required such contracts to
be in a specified form. The state will protect its citizens against fraud,
imposition, and unconscionable conduct, but not against the conse-
quences of acts done in good faith, lawful where done, and not con-
trary to the public policy of this State.
VI. RES JUDICATA
We have been dealing thus far with the various kinds of judicial action
that may be masked by public policy theorizing. Whatever the judicial action,
though, there is no doubt that once a court has disposed of a claim or defense
on public policy grounds, that claim or defense can never again be raised in that
state. The problem remains: What effect should a court in another state give
to the public policy disposition made in the first state? At this point, there is
no way for the second court to duck an inquiry into what was actually done
under the guise of public policy.
Most courts, when they dismiss on public policy grounds, have proceeded
on the theory that if a cause of action violates public policy, they lack jurisdiction
over the case. Hence, it would follow that the decision to dismiss the out-of-state
claim is not a decision on the merits. Supposedly, the effect of a court's dismissal
is simply to remit the plaintiff to a forum where his claim is consistent with
public policy. There the defendant would not be protected by res judicata. 1 0
We believe that this is an accurate description of a very small percentage of
the public policy decisions. It should not even be applied to all cases in which
the forum has little connection with the transaction before it. It seems appli-
cable to cases like Reed v. Kelly, 151 and Jacobsen v. Saner,152 where the plaintiff
was simply denied access to the courts of the forum state. Similarly, the appli-
cation of local law to protect a state's system of remedies should'not prevent
149. 303 Pa. 453, 462, 154 AUt. 707, 709 (1931).
150. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 49, comment a (1942). The result would be similar
to that reached in a well known case, Warner v. Buffalo Drydock Co., 67 F.2d 540 (2d
Cir. 1933), which held that a dismissal by one court on account of laches did not bar
recovery in another court.
151. Discussed in text at note 131 supra.
152. Discussed in text at note 40 mtpra.
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a second state from using its procedure should that state wish to do so. But
the description is inapplicable to a case like Farmers' & Merchants' Nat'l Bank
v. Anderson,'153 where the Iowa Supreme Court held that a Texas-based claim
was unjust. The Andersdn opinion concludes with this language, "[W] e hold
that the petition does not state a cause of action against the defendants." In
deciding that the plaintiff's claim was contrary to the public policy of the state,
the forum was actually adjudicating whether the plaintiff should have a claim
against the defendant and making a decision on the merits of the case.
When a court holds that it will not grant relief because to do so would be
unfair in the particular case or because the law on which the plaintiff's claim
is based is pernicious or brutal, is this not a declaration of rights between the
parties as much as a holding that the plaintiff may not recover because the
contract lacked consideration? In most countries dismissals on public policy
grounds are considered entitled to full res judicata effect. 154 This rule has
the advantage of making it clear to judges that a dismissal on public policy
grounds really does deprive a claimant of compensation. 155 If a comparable rule
were followed in this country, the courts could no longer make the assumption,
in practice often so contrary to fact, that the plaintiff is not irreparably harmed
by the public policy dismissal because he can press his claim elsewhere.1 66 ,
Without going so far as other nations we should modify our assertions
about the res judicata effect of a public policy dismissal when the forum has
little connection with the case before it. Res judicata should depend upon what
the deciding court has, in fact, decided. Has it decided that A has no claim
against B, or has it decided that A may not, in this state, make his claim against
B ? It may well be difficult to determine what a court has done, but that should
not stand in the way of making the proper attempt.
In cases in which the forum has contacts with the suit in its courts and is,
in fact, making a choice of law decision and applying its own law to the contro-
versy, there is no doubt that such a decision should be given res judicata effect
in another jurisdiction. This is especially clear in the situs of property cases
discussed earlier. 157 When Texas says that to enforce a foreign secret lien
against a bona fide purchaser is contrary to her public policy, she is not inviting
the lienor to try his hand in another state where such liens will receive better
153. Discussed in text at note 145 supra.
154. See 2 RABFL, op. cit. mipra note 123, at 583-84.
155. "It would be rather dangerous to open an easy middle road for provincial minds."
Id. at 584.
156. When an individual or single-state 'corporation is the defendant, obtaining juris-
diction in another state may be impossible. If the trial of the action took place in one of
our larger cities with congested calendars, it is likely that by the time the appeal has run
its course, the statute of limitations will have run.
157. See text at note 52 supra.
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treatment; she is adjudicating the rights of the lienor and the purchaser for all
time.
Again, of course, a court in a second jurisdiction has the problem of de-
ciding what was actually done by the first court, and it is probably here that the
danger of using the blunderbuss public policy is most clearly underlined. By
resorting to public policy theorizing instead of analyzing the problem before
it, the first court gives a second court little help in deciding what course to take
when the same claim is presented to it.
The easy case is that in which a defense is struck down because it violates
public policy. Such a decision is inevitably entitled to res judicata effect.1 58
It is worth pointing out here that almost all of the cases which have refused to
recognize a defense on public policy grounds have involved contacts with the
forum of sufficient importance to justify the choice of the forum's law and
hence were, in reality, choice of law decisions.
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL LIIiTATIONS
When a state refuses to entertain a cause of action recognized by a sister
state on the ground that the content of the sister law violates public policy, a
constitutional question is raised under the full faith and credit clause. Most fre-
quently it is assumed that full faith and credit only lays down requirements for
the out-of-state enforcement of statutory causes of action, but that assumption
is by no means established. The full faith and credit clause speaks of "Public
Acts, Records and Judicial Proceedings." Clearly a statute is a public act, a term
difficult to apply to judge made law. Yet the Supreme Court could place case
law within the constitutional language.15 9 Because the question does not affect
full faith and credit principles but only the extent of their application, the dis-
cussion that follows is pertinent whether or not case law is entitled to full faith
and credit respect.
Hughes v. Fetter'60 is the most important case concerning the refusal to
apply sister state law on public policy grounds even though the forum has no
significant contacts with the case. In that case an administrator sought re-
covery in Wisconsin, relying on the Illinois wrongful death statute, for Hughes'
death in Illinois. Both Hughes and the tortfeasor were citizens of Wisconsin.
The Wisconsin courts dismissed the complaint, holding that a Wisconsin
158. See the discussion in Holderness v. Hamilton Fire Ins. Co., 54 F. Supp. 145,
147 (S.D. Fla. 1944).
159. See 1 CRossxxY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 545-48 (1953) ; Jackson, Full
Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUm. L. Rav. 1, 12
(1945) ; Sumner, The Status of Pudblic Acts in Sister States, 3 U.C.L.A.L. Ray. 1, 7
(1955) ; comment, 13 ILL. L. REv. 43, 56 (1918).
160. 341 U.S. 609 (1951). In the narrow area of the enforcement of statutory liability
against shareholders of an insolvent state bank a state must grant relief on a sister
state claim. Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
1012 [Vol. 56
"PUBLIC POLICY" IN CONFLICTS
statute established a local public policy against entertaining suits brought under
the wrongful death acts of other states. The Supreme Court of the United
States reversed. The "strong unifying principle embodied in the Full Faith and
Credit Clause looking toward maximum enforcement in each state of the obliga-
tions or rights created or recognized by the statutes of sister states"'161 required
Wisconsin policy to give way. Wisconsin had "no real feeling of antagonism
against wrongful death suits in general."' 62 That state permitted such actions
when litigation arose from Wisconsin facts. Differences were noted between
the Wisconsin law and the Illinois law, but a footnote to Mr. Justice Black's
opinion says:
It may well be that the wrongful death acts of Wisconsin and Illinois
contain different provisions in regard to such matters as maximum
recovery and disposition of the proceeds of suit. Such differences,
however, are generally considered unimportant.1
Whether the result in the Hughes case would have been otherwise if the differ-
ences had been greater is an open question.
To assess the present authority of Hughes v. Fetter is difficult because the
Court was divided five to four. The result could be changed by a newly intro-
duced factor moving only a single justice. The problem is even more trouble-
some because of changes in the Court's personnel since 1951, Chief Justice
Warren having replaced Chief Justice Vinson, who voted with the majority in
Hughes, Justice Harlan having replaced Justice Jackson, a dissenter, and Mr.
Justice Brennan having replaced Mr. Justice Minton, another dissenter.
The Hughes opinion noted that Wisconsin might be the only forum having
jurisdiction over the defendant. However, one may not conclude that full faith
and credit is satisfied by limiting the refusal to decide to those out-of-state
death cases which may be maintained in other states. In First Nat'l Bank v.
United Air Lines, Inc.,164 written during the term of court following the
Hughes case, the Supreme Court invalidated an Illinois statute similar to the
Wisconsin act.
The reasons supporting our invalidation of Wisconsin's statute
apply with equal force to that of Illinois. This is true although Illi-
nois agrees to try cases where service cannot be obtained in another
state. While we said in Hughes v. Fetter that it was relevant that
Wisconsin might be the only state in which service could be had on
one of the defendants, we were careful to point out that this fact was
not crucial. 165
161. 341 U.S. at 612.
162. Ibid.
163. Id. at 612 n.11.
164. 342 U.S. 396 (1952).
165. Id. at 398.
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Save for First Natl Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc., the Supreme Court
has refused to extend Hughes v. Fetter. In Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co.,100
a case not involving the public policy defense, the Court refused to require
Pennsylvania to apply an Alabama statute of limitations in a wrongful death
action based on Alabama facts instead of the shorter statute of Pennsylvania.
Hughes v. Fetter and the First Nat'l Bank case had no application. "The cru-
cial factor in those two cases was that the forum laid an uneven hand on causes
of action arising within and without the forum state.' 0 7 If Hughes only for-
bids discrimination against sister state causes similar to those recognized
locally, its impact is limited indeed. It would have no bearing on a refusal to
apply sister state law repugnant to the forum or law not at all similar to any
of the forum's local law.
The Wells case is interesting in one more respect in regard to Hughes v.
Fetter's influence on the public policy doctrine. Wells lpoks to history and the
general conflicts rules in the states today. The Pennsylvania statute of limita-
tions can be applied without violating full faith and credit because old cases
have so held. The rule that the forum applies its own statute of limitations is
"the usual conflicts rule of the states." 168 Hughes v. Fetter does not call for a
"change in the well-established rule."'1 9 A look to history or to expressions of
current state law to determine the constitutional limits on public policy means,
of course, that the doctrine will not be changed by constitutional mandatey °o
Hughes v. Fetter does at least stand for the proposition that a sister state's'
claim may not be dismissed simply because the local law differs in some detail
from out-of-state law. To that extent, the requirement of "substantial sim-
ilarity" between the law of the forum and a sister state is unconstitutional.' 1 '
Yet the case falls far short of obliterating the public policy defense. The opin-
ion leaves open the question whether sister state law may be disregarded when
166. 345 U.S. 514 (1953).
167. Id. at 518.
168. Id. at 517.
169. Id. at 518.
170. The public policy doctrine has been recognized by the Supreme Court in di-
versity cases. A famous quotation is found in Bond v. Hume, 243 U.S. 15, 21 (1917),
in which it was said to be rudimentary that a state "will not lend the aid of its courts to
enforce a contract founded upon a foreign law where to do so would be repugnant to
good morals, would lead to disturbance and disorganization of the local municipal law, or
in other, words, violate the public policy of the State where the enforcement of the foreign
contract is sought." See the statement in Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S.
145, 160 (1932), "[A] plaintiff . . .might be denied relief ... because the enforcement
of the right conferred would be obnoxious to the public policy of the forum." In Griffin v.
McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941), the Court decided that, under the Erie doctrine a federal
court must follow the public policy doctrine of'the state in which it sits. Of course, Erie
would not apply if the state's rule were unconstitutional.
171. Some of the language in Justice Frankfurter's opinion, which speaks for the four-judge minority, supports the argument that the substantial similarity rule is constitutional.
After calling attention to the differences between the Wisconsin and Illinois death acts he
said, "These diversities reasonably suggest application by local judges versed in them."
341 U.S. at 619.
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the differences are very great or when the forum has "real feelings of antag-
onism" against it. What we learn from Hughes is that states are not com-
pletely free to dismiss on policy grounds. "[I] t is for this Court to choose in
each case between the competing public policies involved."1 72 The freedom
which the court will permit is, nevertheless, very great.
Where the public policy doctrine is really only the occasion for a choice
of local law in a conflict of laws situation, the same constitutional questions are
raised under the due process and full faith and credit clauses that would be
presented by any other choice of law rule adopted by the forum. The forum
may not choose a law completely unrelated to the transaction before the court
even if the law chosen is its own.173 In the narrow area of fraternal benefit as-
sociation cases full faith and credit requires the application of the law of the
state of incorporation. 174 Aside from these limitations a state may adopt such
choice of law rule as it pleases. Professor Reese has' written of the constitu-
tional limitations on a state's choice of law: "Due process no longer forbids a
state from applying its own law unless it has no reasonable contact with the
transaction, and, where such a reasonable contact exists, full faith and credit
does not compel a state to apply another's law in preference to its own."'17 5
It is thus highly improbable that the Supreme Court will, by use of federal
materials, interfere significantly with the public policy doctrine in conflict of
laws cases. .If improvement is to come, it must come from the state judges
themselves.
VIII. CONCLUSION
All the commentators would retain the public policy principle in conflicts
to the extent that it is grounded in basic moral conceptions or in ideas of funda-
mental justice, and we agree. If the foreign law normally applicable violates
the strongest moral convictions or appears profoundly unjust at the forum,
the law should not be applied. The principle can be defended on the ground
that, above all, any court's job is to aim at the just accommodation of contro-
versy or, perhaps, with the notion that the decisions of courts should not "ex-
hibit to the citizens of the state an example pernicious and detestable.'' 17 6 -Yet
172. Id. at 611.
173. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143
(1934) ; Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
174. Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
175. Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Statutes: The Defense of Public Policy, 19
U. Cni. L. REv. 339, 342 (1952). There has been a great deal of discussion about the full
faith and credit clause and the role of public policy in the field of workmen's compensation.
See Stone, The Forum's Policy and the Defense of Faith and Credit to Workmen's Com-
pensation Acts, 41 IowA L. REv. 558 (1956).
176. Greenwood v. Curtis, 6 Mass. 358, 378 (1810). For an interesting formulation
as to when foreign law is sufficiently outrageous to warrant a refusal to apply it, see
Adams v. Gay, 19 Vt. 358, 367 (1847): "[W]e must be able to find but one pervading
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such cases, between countries of the civilized world and certainly between the
states, will be few indeed. Perhaps the public policy idea can be used to achieve
justice in a particular case if the strictest limitations are observed.\
The most troublesome use of public policy comes when it is employed as
a cloak for the selection of local law to govern a transaction having important
local contacts. Resort to the concept is beguilingly easy and does not demand
the hard thinking which the careful formulation of narrower, more realistic,
choice of law rules would require. Most of the critics have argued for a nar-
rowing of the area in which opinions resort to public policy. They contend
that foreign transactions will otherwise be judged according to "local fancies"
and subjected to judicial parochialism. On the other hand Nussbaum has
urged the greater use of public policy on the ground that the retreat of liberal-
ism requires more self-defepsive measures at the forum. 177 We urge that courts
make the proper distinctions. We urge that courts take a second look and ask,
"In what sense are we applying the public policy doctrine ?" If judges honestly
put the question whether the foreign law is barbarous in its provisions or fright-
fully unjust in the particular case, few cases will provide an affirmative answer.
If a judge sees that, in a given case, public policy doctrine substitutes for choice
of law, he should address himself directly to questions concerning choice of
law policy. What are the most important contacts with respect to the matter
at hand? Will the reference to local law be made only in the forum state so
that it achieves a result not obtainable in other possible places of trial? Should
a broadly-stated choice of law rule, supposedly applicable to the problem at
hand, be narrowed to take into account the significance of differences in detail?
What policies are served by one choice of law rule rather than another? Can
our judicial system accommodate this case without serious dislocation?
The principal vice of the public policy concepts is that they provide a sub-
stitute for analysis. The concepts stand in the way of careful thought, of dis-
criminating distinctions, and of true policy development in the conflict of laws.
feeling upon that subject,--so much so, that a contrary feeling, in an individual, would
denominate him either insane, or diseased in his moral perceptions." This language is
quoted with approval in Swann v. Swann, 21 Fed. 299, 305 (E.D. Ark. 1884).
177. "Practicing liberalism becomes preposterous where it is exercised towards a for-
eign law which is plainly directed against the interests of the forum." Nussbaum, Public
Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws, 49 YALE L.J. 1027, 1049 (1940). An
even more extreme position urging wider use of public policy is found in Kronstein,
Crisis of "Conflict of Laws," 37 GEao. L.J. 483, 511 (1949) :
We cannot sustain our present method of finding the applicable law on a basis
of a bridge between facts and an artificial legal concept, subject to the moulding
of the parties, and then try to protect public policy in extreme cases. Instead,
the public order has to be given the primary consideration.
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